Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional Norm that the Court Should Substantially Enforce by Schoenbrod, David
DigitalCommons@NYLS 
Articles & Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional Norm that the Court 
Should Substantially Enforce 
David Schoenbrod 
New York Law School, david.schoenbrod@nyls.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Schoenbrod, David, "Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional Norm that the Court Should Substantially 
Enforce" (2020). Articles & Chapters. 1346. 
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1346 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
 CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: 
A CONSTITUTIONAL NORM THAT THE COURT 
SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ENFORCE 
DAVID SCHOENBROD* 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 214 
I.  THE CONSENT-OF-THE-GOVERNED NORM ......... 219 
A.  The Norm’s Provenance ............................... 219 
B.  What the Original Norm Would Require of 
Congress ......................................................... 222 
II.  THE IMPEDIMENTS TO JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE ORIGINAL NORM ............................................ 224 
A.  The Impediments’ Evolution ....................... 224 
B.  The Impediments Today .............................. 236 
III.  CONGRESS FLOUTS THE NORM ............................. 238 
A.  Congress’s Duty to Comply with the Norm 
to the Extent Practical ................................... 238 
B.  Congress Could Comply with the Norm to a 
Substantial Extent .......................................... 240 
C.  How Flouting the Norm Benefits Legislators 
Politically ........................................................ 244 
D.  How Flouting the Norm Harms the 
Legislators’ Constituents .............................. 248 
                                                                                                        
 * Trustee Professor, New York Law School; Senior Fellow, Niskanen Center. 
Ronald A. Cass, Christopher C. DeMuth, Douglas H. Ginsburg, C. Boyden Gray, 
Philip Hamburger, David R. Johnson, Gary S. Lawson, Michael B. Mukasey, 
Joseph Postell, Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Lawrence G. Sager, Ross Sandler, James F. 
Simon, Richard B. Stewart, Jerry Taylor, and Peter J. Wallison provided insightful 
comments. So too did the participants in the faculty workshop at New York Law 
School, the research roundtable and symposium on “Delegation, Nondelegation, 
and Un-Delegation” at the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative 
State at George Mason University, a panel at the New Civil Liberties Alliance, a 
panel at the Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Convention, and Professor E. 
Donald Elliott’s seminar at Yale Law School. William Mills of the New York Law 
School Library, Reza Ravangard, New York Law School class of 2019, and Ethan 
Clarkson, New York Law School class of 2020, solved many difficult research 
problems. I decline to delegate responsibility for any errors that remain. 
214 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 43 
 
IV. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD DO ........................... 253 
A.  The Court’s Job .............................................. 253 
B.  How the Court Could Do Its Job ................. 256 
V.  FAR-FETCHED RATIONALES FOR IGNORING THE 
NORM ..................................................................... 265 
A.  The Constitution Permits Congress to Leave 
Lawmaking to Agencies ............................... 265 
B.  Even Early Congresses Ignored the  
Norm .............................................................. 266 
C.  The Court Enforced the Norm in Only One 
Year of Hundreds .......................................... 271 
D.  The Constitution Was Amended to Eliminate 
the Norm ......................................................... 272 
E.  Delegation Is Consistent with Consent of the 
Governed ........................................................ 273 
F.  Canons of Statutory Construction Serve the 
Purpose of the Norm ..................................... 276 
CONCLUSION ................................................................ 278 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Declaration of Independence proclaims that govern-
ments derive “their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned.”1 To condition the federal government’s powers upon 
such consent, the Constitution vested responsibility for exercis-
ing certain basic powers, including the power to make rules of 
private conduct, in the branch of government most directly ac-
countable to the governed, Congress.2 Members of Congress 
would then bear personal responsibility for the exercise of 
these legislative powers, and the governed could withhold con-
sent by refusing to reelect these legislators. This arrangement 
was central to the compact that the Framers of the Constitution 
offered to the people.3 As James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 
51, “A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary con-
trol on the government . . . .”4 
                                                                                                        
 1. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
No. 1] Consent of the Governed 215 
 
That members of Congress bear such personal responsibility 
is a constitutional norm. As originally conceived, this norm re-
quired Congress to make all the rules of private conduct. Given 
the quantity of rules now being issued, it is hard to believe 
Congress could bring itself to make them all.5 This limitation 
on Congress’s ability to provide rules impedes the courts from 
fully enforcing the norm as originally conceived. 
The Supreme Court has, however, erred in how it dealt with 
this impediment to judicial enforcement. It has held that Congress 
does not delegate its legislative powers so long as it states an 
“intelligible principle” to guide agency rulemaking.6 Thus, 
though the norm as originally understood required Congress 
itself to make the rules of private conduct, the “intelligible 
principle” test allows Congress to leave such rulemaking to 
agencies so long as Congress says enough about the goals that 
the agency should pursue in making the rules. “Enough,” 
however, is a question of degree. Judges would inevitably have 
difficulty in comparing the degree to which statutes guide 
agency rulemaking given the quite different topics of regula-
tion. The test is therefore mush and, as such, judicially unman-
ageable and unenforceable. The upshot is that Congress can 
outsource responsibility for the laws by giving lip service to the 
vaguest of goals.7 
Emblematic of this trivializing of the norm, some of the Justices’ 
opinions began a half century ago to call it the “nondelegation 
doctrine.” This label conceals the norm’s vital consent-of-the-
governed purpose, much as if equal protection of the laws was 
                                                                                                        
 5. My past scholarship on delegation minimized the need for Congress to dele-
gate legislative powers, at least after a period of transition. See, e.g., DAVID 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEO-
PLE THROUGH DELEGATION 135–52, 165–79 (1993) [hereinafter POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY] (arguing delegation creates incentives for Congress to make regu-
lation more complex and that, without those incentives, Congress could enact a 
simpler set of rules that would achieve regulatory objectives more effectively and 
efficiently); see also DAVID SCHOENBROD, RICHARD B. STEWART & KATRINA M. 
WYMAN, BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT WILL WORK 
(2010) [hereinafter LOGJAM]. Nonetheless, I now see that the Court could not en-
force the original norm completely without risking overwhelming political oppo-
sition, as discussed in Part II of this Article. 
 6. The “intelligible principle” language first appeared in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. 
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, argues that only later did the Court begin to use it as 
a test of the constitutionality of statutes. Id. at 2139–41 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
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called the “nondifferentiation doctrine” or freedom of the press 
was called the “nonfiltering principle.”8 
The “nondelegation doctrine” label thus makes congressional 
responsibility sound like a technicality beloved only by cranks 
who oppose regulatory protection, although the overwhelming 
majority of the governed want such protection. In my own ex-
perience as an environmental advocate, I concluded that dele-
gation often allows members of Congress to avoid blame for 
failing to deliver regulatory protection. Because the governed 
overwhelmingly want both protection and a Congress account-
able for the rules of private conduct, I refer to the “consent-of-
the-governed norm” rather than the “nondelegation doctrine.”9 
Yet, if the Court suddenly began enforcing the norm, even a 
less stringent version than the original norm, the reversal could 
cast a pall of doubt over the validity of a massive number of 
rules in the Code of Federal Regulation. It would take many 
years of litigation to determine the validity of these rules and 
years more, if not decades, for Congress to repair the resulting 
chinks in the regulatory system. Thus, our nation’s reliance on 
massive delegation also impedes enforcement of the norm. 
This Article argues that the Court could find a path through 
the impediments, including Congress’s inability to provide all 
the needed rules and the present reliance on delegation, to en-
force the norm to a substantial, though incomplete, extent. The 
path should begin by distinguishing between the original norm 
and the impediments to its full judicial enforcement. The dis-
tinction between the norm and the impediments to its judicial 
enforcement would make clear that, regardless of the inability 
of the Court to fully enforce the norm, members of Congress, 
having sworn to uphold the Constitution,10 are honor bound to 
comply with the norm to the extent practical. 
The Court would then be left with a constitutional duty to 
follow a path that enables it to enforce the norm to the extent 
permitted by the impediments to judicial enforcement. One 
                                                                                                        
 8. The earliest use of the term “nondelegation doctrine” or “non-delegation 
doctrine” in a Supreme Court opinion is in a passage citing with approval Professor 
Kenneth Culp Davis’s call to explicitly abandon the doctrine. McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 274 n.27 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 1 KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01–2.05 (1958)). 
 9. For the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra Parts II–III. 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
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step on this path would be to hold that the Court will strike 
down significant new regulations whose promulgation the leg-
islative process has not approved. The idea that Congress 
should vote on significant new regulations has a bipartisan 
pedigree, yet both parties in Congress—each in its own way—
assiduously avoid putting the idea into practice.11 As Part IV.B 
will show, the Court can construct a test of the significance of 
regulations that is judicially manageable. The Court should fore-
warn Congress of its intention to take this step so that Congress 
could organize itself to vote on the promulgation of these sig-
nificant new regulations. A subsequent step might be to force 
Congress to gradually take responsibility for the most im-
portant preexisting regulations. 
Implicit in this approach is that impediments to judicial en-
forcement often require the Court to adopt tests that are less 
stringent than the norms themselves. Such underenforcement 
of constitutional norms may seem strange because the Court 
does not exactly advertise it, but it happens nonetheless. An 
example discussed in Part III.A is the equal protection norm, 
which forbids states from treating people unequally without 
fair reason. Impeded by concern for usurping the policymaking 
prerogatives of states in run-of-the-mill cases, the Court uses a 
deferential test allowing some violations of the norm. Part IV.A 
shows that the Court changes the tests it applies when it per-
ceives better ways to skirt impediments to the judicial en-
forcement of constitutional norms. Thus, by “constitutional 
norm,” I mean a requirement of the Constitution and by “test” 
I mean a standard that courts use to avoid impediments to full 
enforcement of a constitutional norm. 
This Article’s proposed approach to judicial enforcement 
would provide less complete compliance with the consent-of-
the-governed norm than the approach advocated in my earlier 
scholarship.12 Since my earlier publications, I have had the ben-
efit of private communications with sitting Justices from the 
left, right, and center—none still on the Court. These discus-
sions gave me the impression that they would have liked to do 
more to enforce the norm, but given the impediments, they 
                                                                                                        
 11. For the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra Parts III–IV.B. 
 12. This Article suggests a method of enforcement quite different than strict 
enforcement of the norm after a period of transition. See SCHOENBROD, POWER 
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 170–91. 
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were unsure of how to do so. This Article responds to such 
concerns. 
The Court’s recent disposition of Gundy v. United States13 
suggests five Justices might be willing to revive judicial enforce-
ment of the consent-of-the-governed norm.14 All Justices should 
join in reviving the norm, especially now that the Presidency of 
Donald Trump has made starkly evident what was true before: 
legislators have long shirked their constitutional duty to take 
responsibility for the exercise of legislative powers and the result 
is often harm to their constituents. The Court’s failure to enforce 
the norm has resulted in Congress and Presidents under both 
parties devising and imposing new ways of delegating power 
that allow incumbents to take credit for popular promises yet 
shift blame for unpopular consequences.15 By so doing, the in-
cumbents avoid the hard choices needed to deliver more effective 
regulatory protection and reduce pointless regulatory burdens.16 
Examples with deadly consequences for the governed are dis-
cussed in Part III.D. Such disgraceful legislative behavior, 
made possible by the Court’s failure to enforce the norm, has 
contributed to loss of trust in government.17 Trust in the federal 
government to do “the right thing” most of time fell from 
                                                                                                        
 13. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 14. The dissent by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas, calls for reinvigorating the norm. Id. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion that, “If a majority of this Court were 
willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would 
support the effort.” Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice 
Kavanaugh did not participate in the decision. Later, Justice Kavanaugh wrote an 
opinion in which he stated that Justice Gorsuch’s “scholarly analysis of the 
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further 
consideration in future cases.” Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). For discussions of the likeli-
hood that Gundy would lead to the enforcement of the norm, see Nicholas Bagley, 
Opinion, ‘Most of Government is Unconstitutional’, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2Y7UsXg]; David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Opinion, Alito Teases a 
Judicial Revolution, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2019, 3:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
alito-teases-a-judicial-revolution-11561317002 [https://perma.cc/K8HZ-EPP7]. 
 15. DAVID SCHOENBROD, DC CONFIDENTIAL: INSIDE THE FIVE TRICKS OF 
WASHINGTON 39–53, 70–74 (2017). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Howard Dean & David Schoenbrod, Populism is powerful because Washington 
deserves a kick in the pants, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://usat.ly/
2zwIRnL [https://perma.cc/N2X6-RZC7]. 
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three-quarters of voters in 1964 to one-third in 1980 and only 
one-fifth in 2015, and one-sixth in 2019.18 
Part I of this Article explains the original concept of the consent-
of-the-governed norm. Part II discusses the evolving impedi-
ments to judicial enforcement of the norm. Part III shows that 
members of Congress should comply with the norm to a sub-
stantial extent, and their failure to do so causes grievous harm 
to their constituents. Part IV shows how the Court could and 
should substantially achieve the purpose of the norm. Part V 
argues that the many rationales for ignoring the norm are flimsy. 
I. THE CONSENT-OF-THE-GOVERNED NORM  
A. The Norm’s Provenance 
To require the consent of the governed, the Constitution em-
powered voters to sack the key policy makers. Article I vests 
“All legislative Powers herein granted,” including making regu-
latory law, in a Congress, including a House of Representatives 
directly elected at two year intervals, legislating in tandem 
with a President.19 To make members of Congress personally 
responsible, Article I requires how they vote—”the Yeas and 
Nays”—be published when requested by one-fifth of the legis-
lators present.20 So, these directly or indirectly elected officials 
would be accountable for the hard legislative choices.21 Such 
accountability would enable the governed to withhold their 
consent in response to the decisions of elected officials.22 That 
was the deal that the Framers offered the people. 
Members of Congress would bear personal responsibility 
even though voters may pay little attention until a vote for or 
                                                                                                        
 18. Public Trust in Government: 1958–2019, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://
www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019/ [https://
perma.cc/2BV8-NDPM]. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2, 7–8. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceed-
ings . . . and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question 
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”). 
 21. The Constitution does not, of course, call for the President to be popularly 
elected, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–3, and did not do so for senators until the 
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Nonetheless, 
even without direct elections, popular sentiment could result in either Presidents or 
senators failing to get reelected. 
 22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 50, supra note 4, at 314–17 (James Madison). 
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against a rule directly affects them. As Justice Kagan, quoting 
James Madison, wrote in a powerful dissent from the Court’s 
refusal to take on political gerrymandering: 
To retain an “intimate sympathy with the people,” [mem-
bers of Congress] must be “compelled to anticipate the mo-
ment” when their “exercise of [power] is to be reviewed.” 
Election day—next year, and two years later, and two years 
after that—is what links the people to their representatives, 
and gives the people their sovereign power. That day is the 
foundation of democratic governance.23 
Debate at the Constitutional Convention proceeded on the 
premise that Congress had to make the law itself rather than 
delegate that job to others.24 John Locke, who influenced many 
of the Framers, thought a people’s grant of legislative power 
was “only to make laws, and not to make legislators” because 
“when the people have said, [w]e will submit to rules, and be 
governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no 
body else can say other men shall make laws for them.”25 
Making the regulatory law meant not just passing statutes 
but passing statutes that state the rules of private conduct.26 In 
Federalist No. 75, Alexander Hamilton wrote “The essence of the 
legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to pre-
scribe rules for the regulation of the society . . . .”27 In Fletcher v. 
Peck,28 decided in 1810, the Supreme Court wrote, “It is the pecu-
liar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the 
government of society; the application of those rules to individu-
als in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.”29 
                                                                                                        
 23. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2512 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NOS. 52, 
57, at 124, 155 (James Madison) (J. & A. McLean eds., 1788)). 
 24. JOHN L. FITZGERALD, CONGRESS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 35–39 
(1986); see generally JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (2017). 
 25. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (Richard H. Cox ed., 
Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1690). 
 26. For an argument to the contrary, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1733 (2002). Part V.A 
addresses their argument. 
 27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 4, at 449 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 28. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 29. Id. at 136; see also, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2138 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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And in Gibbons v. Ogden,30 decided in 1824, the Court wrote 
that the power to regulate commerce, which Article I includes 
in the legislative power, is “to prescribe the rule by which 
commerce is to be governed.”31 It is no wonder then that school 
civics courses once taught that it is Congress’s job to make the 
laws and that its members are called “lawmakers.” 
In Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States,32 decided in 1813, 
the Court recognized in dicta that Congress may not delegate 
the power to make the rules of private conduct.33 The statute in 
question conditioned a rule imposing a maritime embargo on 
the President’s findings on whether other nations respected 
American neutrality.34 Based upon the President’s findings, the 
embargo took effect.35 The attorney for the party charged with 
violating the embargo argued, “Congress could not transfer the 
legislative power to the President. To make the revival of a law 
depend upon the President’s proclamation, is to give to that 
proclamation the force of a law.”36 The Court responded that 
the President was not making a rule but rather applying a leg-
islated rule by determining “the occurrence of any subsequent 
combination of events.”37 This was not rulemaking but rather, 
as Fletcher put it, “the application of [legislated] rules.”38 The 
Court thus suggested that Congress could not delegate the 
power to make rules of private conduct to the executive 
branch. 
                                                                                                        
 30. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 31. Id. at 196. 
 32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). 
 33. Id. at 388. 
 34. Id. at 382–83. 
 35. Id. at 382. 
 36. Id. at 386. 
 37. Id. at 388. The passage in full is: 
[W]e can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise 
its discretion in reviving the act of March 1st, 1809, either expressly or 
conditionally, as their judgment should direct. The 19th section of that act 
declaring that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer, 
could not restrict their power of extending its operation, without 
limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events. 
Id. 
 38. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810). 
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B. What the Original Norm Would Require of Congress 
To discharge its responsibility to make the rules of private 
conduct as the norm originally required, Congress must itself 
state the rules binding society in understandable terms, such as 
a rule limiting pollution from designated factories. The rules 
must be understandable so that voters can hold their repre-
sentatives responsible in future elections. Understandability is 
thus essential to serve the bedrock purpose of Article I. 
In contrast, a statute like the modern Clean Air Act that tells 
an agency to make rules to achieve some goal like “protect the 
public health” with “an adequate margin of safety” states a 
goal rather than a rule.39 Stating goals is insufficient because 
Congress can state goals yet avoid responsibility to the gov-
erned for how the agency resolves major political controversies 
in drafting the rule. As such, allowing Congress to do no more 
than state goals conflicts with the original consent-of-the-
governed norm. For example, “protect the public health” is a 
pleasing goal yet, when this language was inserted in the statute 
in 1970,40 the statute’s chief author, Senator Edmund Muskie, 
knew that the agency could not fully achieve the goal. As he 
later admitted after the air pollution problem was safely in the 
lap of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): 
Our public health scientists and doctors have told us that 
there is no threshold, that any air pollution is harmful. The 
Clean Air Act is based on the assumption, although we 
knew at the time it was inaccurate, that there is a threshold. 
When we set the standards [the responsibility for whose setting 
Congress in fact left to the EPA], we understood that below 
the standards that we set there would still be health effects.41 
Yet, Congress took credit for unconditionally protecting 
health.42 Nor did Congress decide, in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, how to allocate the cleanup burden among the sources 
                                                                                                        
 39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
 40. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1676, 
1680. 
 41. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Envtl. 
Pollution of the Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, pt. 3, 95th Cong. 8 (1977) (statement 
of Sen. Edmund Muskie). 
 42. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: 
HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE 
PEOPLE 70–72 (2005). 
No. 1] Consent of the Governed 223 
 
that contribute to unhealthy pollution.43 So, the legislators had 
plausible deniability for almost any unpopular consequences of 
the rules announced on agency letterhead. 
A statute that takes the form of a rule but in fact fails to state 
a rule of conduct in understandable terms, such as one that 
bars large factories from emitting “unreasonable” pollution, 
violates the original consent-of-the-governed norm. What was 
unreasonable was understandable when early courts instructed 
juries in tort actions that the standard of reasonable care was 
how people in their community customarily behaved, but it 
would not be understandable when applied to a modern factory.44 
Custom is no guide to the meaning of “unreasonable” when we 
confront newly understood threats and learn of newly invented 
means to deal with them. Such a statute fails to achieve the ob-
jective of Article I: to make the elected lawmakers responsible 
for the politically salient choices. 
Of course, even a forthright rule will require interpretation in 
some cases.45 Yet, interpreting the law is distinct from policy-
making.46 Interpretation calls for an inquiry into how the enact-
ing legislature would have clarified the law’s ambiguities; poli-
cymaking calls for an inquiry into what makes sense to the 
policymaker. In deciding how the Congress that passed the 
statute would have resolved an ambiguity, a judge can get 
information from many sources. One such source is that, by 
dictating clear outcomes in most cases, the rule usually reveals 
the relative weight the legislature gave to conflicting policy 
                                                                                                        
 43. Id. at 26. The singular exception is that the 1970 statute did require auto 
manufacturers to reduce emissions from new cars by 90 percent. Clean Air 
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690. The 1970 stat-
ute called for the EPA and the states to regulate other sources, but in sufficiently 
general terms that members of Congress could deny responsibility for the specific 
emission limits imposed. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012) (requiring the EPA 
Administrator to regulate new stationary sources). 
 44. See, e.g., Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 820–21; 9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 58 b; 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 87–88 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881). 
 45. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 25, 52 (Robert S. Summers ed., 1968); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND AP-
PLICATION OF LAW 156 (tent. ed. 1958). 
 46. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058–60 (1975). 
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goals, such as enhancing regulatory protection versus avoiding 
regulatory burdens.47 
The original consent-of-the-governed norm is thus based upon 
legal principles that courts routinely apply. The harder ques-
tion is how courts should deal with modern impediments to 
the original norm’s full enforcement. 
II. THE IMPEDIMENTS TO JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
ORIGINAL NORM 
A. The Impediments’ Evolution 
Wayman v. Southard48 decided by the Supreme Court in 1825 
exemplifies the difficulty Congress encountered in legislating 
all the rules of private conduct.49 The statute at issue instructed 
the various federal district courts to adopt rules of procedure 
that track state court procedural rules, but authorized the fed-
eral courts to make “alterations and additions.”50 It would have 
been arduous for Congress to go through the procedural rules 
of each state court system and adapt them to the needs of the 
federal court. The Supreme Court saw no difficulty in allowing 
the federal courts to adopt the rules regulating the courts rather 
than private persons: 
It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the 
Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly 
and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly del-
egate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully 
exercise itself. . . . [Either the courts or Congress,] for exam-
ple, may make rules, directing the returning of writs and 
processes, the filing of declarations and other pleadings, and 
other things of the same description.51 
                                                                                                        
 47. Congress could call upon an agency to interpret a rule stated in a statute. For 
example, a statute might require that, starting five years hence, no fossil-fueled 
power plant may emit sulfur at more than half the current average emission rate 
for such plants and direct the agency to issue a binding regulation stating the 
future limit in numerical terms. The agency would need to interpret and apply the 
statute, but Congress would have faced the salient policy choices. A court could 
then review the agency’s interpretation. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2018). The agency 
would be applying a rule rather than making it. 
 48. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 31. 
 51. Id. at 42–43. 
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The complaint in the case, however, objected to rules that 
governed private persons—in particular, a rule on the en-
forcement of judgments.52 The Court went on to state: 
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those 
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the 
legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a gen-
eral provision may be made, and power given to those who 
are to act under such general provisions to fill up the de-
tails.53 
So, the opinion continued, other officials could “vary minor 
regulations, which are within the great outlines marked out by 
the legislature in directing the execution.”54 “Fill up the details” 
in this context could be understood to be a test to accommodate 
the inability of Congress to state every last rule—”minor” as 
well as major—as required by the state-the-rule definition of 
the norm articulated in Fletcher v. Peck, Brig Aurora, and Gibbons 
v. Ogden.55 
Congress’s difficulty in complying with the original norm 
compounded as the need for new federal rules grew with the 
growth in the nation’s land area, population, technological 
prowess, and interstate activity. Take, for example, a problem 
that came from railroad lines stretching across many states. 
State-by-state ratemaking and litigation were no way to regu-
late an interstate railroad. Yet, Congress itself could not set the 
rates for all the railroads. So, a wide range of interests including 
the railroads themselves urged Congress to establish an agency 
to deal with rates.56 The result was the Interstate Commerce Act 
of 188757 establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission.58 
                                                                                                        
 52. Id. at 11. 
 53. Id. at 43. 
 54. Id. at 45. 
 55. “Fill up the details” might also be a somewhat different statement of the 
norm. Rather than pausing to analyze which version is better or trying to reconcile 
them, this Article will use the state-the-rule version. The reason is that Congress 
now comes nowhere close to complying with either version, as the earlier discus-
sion of the Clean Air Act illustrates, and the point of this Article is to show how 
the Court could begin to bring Congress much closer to the consent-of-the-
governed norm rather than to define it exactly. 
 56. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION 
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920, at 126–31 (1982). 
 57. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 58. Id. at 383. 
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This statute was an early example of a new way of think-
ing about regulation. The new way was brought on by the 
Progressive Movement, quite different from what “progres-
sive” means today. As Professor Robert Wiebe’s excellent 
history of the rise and decline of self-rule in the United States 
explains, the end of the nineteenth century brought exciting 
new technologies, as well as firms doing business on a national 
scale, such as the railroads.59 In addition to their national out-
look, the firms’ executives prided themselves on the quasi-
scientific systems they developed to operate on a national 
scale.60 They hired junior executives from universities that in-
stilled such pride in their students.61 Professor Wiebe calls the 
group with this outlook the “national class” as distinguished 
from the “local middle class,” which comprised the leading 
lights of the older, more parochial order.62 The Ivy League ra-
ther than Podunk College was the path to success among the 
national class.63 According to Professor Wiebe, the national 
class sought to shift power from the state and local level to the 
national and from legislatures beholden to voters to commis-
sions and courts insulated from political pressure and staffed 
by experts—in other words, to people more like themselves.64 
In empowering federal agencies, the Progressives began to 
push the republic down a slippery slope towards Congress sys-
tematically evading responsibility, but evasion was not the 
common objective. To the contrary, many of the Progressives 
believed in separation of powers, including a Congress that 
makes the law, and thought they were honoring these beliefs.65 
For example, they conceived of the Interstate Commerce Act as 
authorizing experts to apply a legislated rule on railroad rates 
rather than to make rules. Whether the standards in various 
statutes left so much wiggle room as to constitute delegations of 
legislative power was not apparent to many of the Progressives 
because they saw their statutes as empowering experts in agen-
                                                                                                        
 59. ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 141 (1995). 
 60. See id. at 143. 
 61. See id. at 142–43. 
 62. Id. at 145. 
 63. See id. at 142–43. 
 64. Id. at 141–46. 
 65. See, e.g., SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 25, 86, 89, 449 (New York & Albany, Banks & Bros. 1891). 
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cies insulated from politics to use scientific methods to find 
correct ways to apply statutes.66 The Court rebuffed assertions 
that the Progressives’ statutes empowering agencies violated 
the consent-of-the-governed norm.67 
Whether the Supreme Court failed to notice violations of the 
norm in cases concerning delegations to expert agencies or de-
cided that they should not enforce it in such cases, the Court 
did enforce it in other sorts of cases. In United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Co.,68 decided in 1921, the Court struck down a federal 
statute on the grounds that it delegated lawmaking power to 
the courts.69 The statute made it a crime to charge “unjust or 
unreasonable” prices for “any necessaries.”70 With a delegation 
to the courts rather than experts, there could be no pretense 
science had made the indefinite definite. The Supreme Court 
held, “Congress alone has power to define crimes against the 
United States.”71 
Similarly, in two other cases—Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,72 
decided in 1920, and Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.,73 decided 
in 1924—the Court struck down statutes that instructed federal 
courts to apply state workman’s compensation statutes in ad-
miralty cases.74 The Justices reasoned that Congress could not 
delegate to state legislatures the power to enact the federal law. 
The Court first used the “intelligible principle” language in 
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States75 decided in 1928, stat-
ing, “If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligi-
                                                                                                        
 66. See WIEBE, supra note 59, at 175–76. 
 67. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 681–94 (1892). 
 68. 255 U.S. 81 (1921). 
 69. Id. at 91–93. 
 70. Id. at 86. 
 71. Id. at 87–88 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocer Co. 264 F. 218, 220 
(E.D. Mo. 1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Delegation of the power to 
make rules of private conduct may be particularly concerning when they are 
backed by criminal sanctions, but many statutes that authorize agencies to make 
rules of private conduct give these agencies the option of enforcing them criminally. 
See JOHN G. MALCOLM, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE 
PROBLEM WITH CRIMINAL REGULATIONS 1–2 (Heritage Found., Legal Memoran-
dum No. 130, 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM130.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H5NR-L7XK]. 
 72. 253 U.S. 149 (1920). 
 73. 264 U.S. 219 (1924). 
 74. Id. at 227–28; Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 166. 
 75. 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
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ble principle to which the person or body authorized to fix 
such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a 
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”76 Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissent in Gundy v. United States, argues that: 
No one at the time thought the phrase [“intelligible princi-
ple”] meant to effect some revolution in this Court’s under-
standing of the Constitution. While the exact line between 
policy and details, lawmaking and factfinding, and legislative 
and nonlegislative functions had sometimes invited reasonable 
debate, everyone agreed these were the relevant inquiries. 
And when Chief Justice Taft wrote of an “intelligible princi-
ple,” it seems plain enough that he sought only to explain 
the operation of these traditional tests; he gave no hint of a 
wish to overrule or revise them . . . . There’s a good argu-
ment, as well, that the statute in J. W. Hampton passed mus-
ter under the traditional tests.77 
Whether J.W. Hampton applied an “intelligible principle” test, 
it did state, “In determining what [Congress] may do in seek-
ing assistance from another branch, the extent and character of 
that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and 
the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.”78 
Such fixing sounds like a policy decision better left to the polit-
ical branches. An editorial in The Constitutional Review said that 
the statute upheld was “the most dangerous advance in bu-
reaucratic government ever attempted in America.”79 
Nonetheless, Justice Gorsuch’s contention that the “intelligi-
ble principle” language was not meant to weaken the test of 
delegation is buttressed by the Court’s response to the National 
Industrial Recovery Act80 passed only five years later. The statute 
granted the President sweeping powers to regulate industry in 
response to the Great Depression but did little to control how 
he used those powers.81 The Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini 
stated admiringly of President Franklin Roosevelt’s sway un-
der the statute, “Ecco un dittatore!”—that is, “Behold a dicta-
                                                                                                        
 76. Id. at 409 (internal quotations omitted). 
 77. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 78. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406. 
 79. J.S. Cotton, The General Welfare Clause, 13 CONST. REV. 98, 101 (1929). 
 80. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
 81. Id. 
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tor!”82 In 1935, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,83 a divided Court 
struck one delegation in the statute.84 Later that year, in A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,85 a unanimous Court, 
including Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone, struck another 
of its delegations.86 Then, in 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,87 
citing Schechter, the Court struck down a delegation of rule-
making power to an association of coal mining companies.88 
Thus, the Court struck down three delegations for violating the 
consent-of-the-governed norm in the seven years after J.W. 
Hampton. 
After winning reelection in 1936, President Roosevelt fa-
mously struck back at the Court, which had defied him on del-
egation and other issues, by proposing a statute authorizing 
him to appoint additional Justices.89 Congress did not pass this 
court-packing plan,90 but the President nonetheless prevailed. 
One of the Court’s changes of position was derisively labeled 
the “switch in time that saved nine,” suggesting that change 
was to protect the Court.91 Yet, the evidence shows that the 
change came before the President announced his plan and was 
made public only afterwards.92 Nonetheless, the Justices did 
seek to insulate the Court from political turmoil.93 The judicial 
                                                                                                        
 82. James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 747, 766 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“dittatore” mis-
spelled in original). 
 83. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 84. Id. at, 419–33. 
 85. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 86. Id. at 529–42. 
 87. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 88. Id. at 310–12 (citing Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537). 
 89. See JAMES F. SIMON, FDR AND CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES 312–15 (2012).  
 90. Id. at 333–34.  
 91. Id. at 327. 
 92. See id. The “switch” refers to the Justice Owen Roberts voting to strike a state 
minimum wage statute in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), 
but then taking a contrary position in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937). 
 93. Chief Justice Hughes worked to frame decisions to minimize the likelihood 
of the Court’s independence being crimped. See SIMON, supra note 89, at 299–300, 
302–06, 323–29, 332, 335–37, 392. For another example, Justice Frankfurter wrote in 
a concurrence in a decision not to take on malapportionment of legislative dis-
tricts, “It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of 
the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essen-
tially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law.” Colegrove 
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of im-
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unmanageability of the intelligible principle test, of course, let 
the Court sidestep the potentially troublesome issue of delegation. 
With retiring Justices replaced by President Roosevelt ap-
pointees and the nation facing the emergencies of the Great 
Depression and World War II, the Court rejected every consti-
tutional challenge to regulatory statutes on consent-of-the-
governed grounds.94 Whatever the Court originally meant by 
“intelligible principle,” it came to mean next to nothing. As Justice 
Kagan stated in her opinion for the Court in Gundy v. United 
States, “we have over and over upheld even very broad delega-
tions” including “to regulate in the ‘public interest.’”95 
Professor Bruce Ackerman argues the confrontation between 
President Roosevelt and the Court, President Roosevelt’s sub-
sequent reelections by overwhelming margins, and the Court’s 
subsequent rulings constituted a “constitutional moment” that 
amended the Constitution to, among other things, allow dele-
gation of legislative power.96 I dispute this argument in Part 
V.D. Nonetheless, as Part IV.A shows, sufficiently strong 
public opinion can, as long as it persists, keep the Court from 
fully enforcing constitutional norms despite the hope that the 
Constitution is a counter-majoritarian imperative. 
Whatever strong public opinion in favor of delegation there 
was no longer persists. According to Professor David Mayhew, 
in polls conducted in 1958, 1977, and 2004 to 2005, by a margin 
of three to one, voters prefer Congress rather than the President 
to “make policies.”97 A poll taken in January 2019 found that 
“[e]ighty-two percent (82%) of voters believe Congress should 
review and approve regulations rather than allowing agencies 
to set them up on their own.”98 In this poll, the support for 
                                                                                                        
pediments to full enforcement of constitutional norms, including “politics,” see 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 163–68 (2019). 
 94. Whitman v. American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing cases). 
 95. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (citing Nat’l Broad. Co. 
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 
287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932)). 
 96. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 306–11 (1991); Bruce A. 
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering The Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 
1053–57, 1070–71 (1984). 
 97. DAVID R. MAYHEW, THE IMPRINT OF CONGRESS 8 (2017). 
 98. Scott Rasmussen, 82% Say Congress Should Review & Approve Federal Regulations, 
SCOTTRASMUSSEN.COM (Jan. 24, 2019), https://scottrasmussen.com/82-say-congress-
should-review-approve-federal-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/W7GD-EVXU]; see also 
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Congress to shoulder responsibility was much the same re-
gardless of party affiliation, race, or political ideology.99 
One manifestation of public opinion against congressional 
buck passing came along with the first Earth Day in 1970. A 
book documenting a study funded by Ralph Nader had 
charged that people died from air pollution because Congress, 
starting with Senator Muskie, had written ineffective air pollu-
tion legislation that gave an agency broad discretion to regulate 
pollution and thereby avoided the hard choices.100 In response, 
Senator Muskie authored the 1970 Clean Air Act, which he as-
serted “faces the air pollution crisis with urgency and in can-
dor. It makes hard choices . . . .”101 As a result, he vowed, “all 
Americans in all parts of the country shall have clean air to 
breathe within the 1970’s.”102 Instead of openly granting an 
agency broad discretion on how to regulate, the new statute 
supposedly ordered the EPA to make rules fully sufficient to 
protect health by deadlines and granted citizens the right to 
enforce this order in federal court.103 The statute did not deliver 
what Senator Muskie maintained it did. It left almost all the 
hard choices to the agency, as Part III.D will show. Congress’s 
need to pretend otherwise evidences public opinion against 
Congress passing the buck. 
When the dust settled from the emergencies of the Great 
Depression, World War II, and the Korean War, Justices ex-
pressed concern for the consent-of-the-governed norm. In Kent 
v. Dulles104 decided in 1958, five Justices invoked it as a reason 
to narrowly construe a statute that otherwise threatened pro-
tected freedoms, and in so doing, the Court limited the authority 
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 100. See Ralph Nader, Foreword to JOHN C. ESPOSITO & LARRY J. SILVERMAN, 
VANISHING AIR: THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION, at 
vii–ix, 287 (1970). 
 101. 116 CONG. REC. 42,381 (1970). 
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 103. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 108(a), 109(a)(1), 
110(f)(2)(b), 84 Stat. 1676, 1678–79, 1683. 
 104. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
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the statute conferred to the executive branch.105 Then, in National 
Cable Television Ass’n v. United States,106 decided in 1974, the 
Court invoked the norm to reject an interpretation of a statute 
that gave an agency the power to tax those it regulated to cover 
the cost of regulation.107 This was the first time the consent-of-
the-governed norm had been applied in a case regarding regu-
latory control of business in four decades. The Justices citing 
the norm in these cases and others were from both sides of the 
political spectrum. 
The norm also played a role in the Supreme Court’s handling 
of a challenge to the Occupational Safety and Health Act.108 It, 
like the Clean Air Act, was passed in 1970 and made high-
sounding promises. It directed the agency to ensure “safe . . . 
places of employment” and reduce occupational exposure to 
toxic materials “to the extent feasible,” without making clear 
what these requirements meant.109 In its decision in Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (often 
called the Benzene case),110 the Court held invalid a regulation 
that the agency promulgated to limit benzene levels in work-
places.111 Arguing that the statute might otherwise be an un-
constitutionally broad delegation, three Justices construed the 
statute to require the agency to base the limit on harms the 
agency determined are significant.112 The agency had failed to 
require that the harm be significant. A fifth Justice, then-Justice 
Rehnquist, voted to declare the Act unconstitutional for dele-
                                                                                                        
 105. Id. at 129 (“Where activities . . . often necessary to the well-being of an 
American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all dele-
gated powers that curtail or dilute them.”). In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 
(1963), three Justices dissented on the grounds that the Court should have in-
voked the norm to construe a statute narrowly. Id. at 625–27 (Harlan, J., dissenting 
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 106. 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
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gating legislative power,113 a position with which Chief Justice 
Burger agreed in a later case.114 
In 1996, in Loving v. United States,115 the Court praised the 
consent-of-the-governed norm in dicta.116 A soldier sentenced 
to death invoked the norm to challenge the constitutionality of 
a statute that empowered the President to establish the criteria 
for such sentences in military tribunals.117 He lost, in part be-
cause of the special authority that the President has in military 
matters, but the Court stated: 
Article I’s precise rules of representation, member qualifica-
tions, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress 
the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative 
lawmaking. Ill suited to that task are the Presidency, de-
signed for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws and 
its own legitimate powers, and the Judiciary, a branch with 
tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control. 
The clear assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, al-
lows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for 
making, or not making, those delicate and necessary deci-
sions essential to governance.118 
Yet, the “clear assignment of power” does not result in the 
Court enforcing the norm in most cases and, where the Court 
does enforce the norm, it asserts that it is not invoking the 
consent-of-the-governed norm. Take the case cited, INS v. 
Chadha.119 It struck the legislative veto which, depending upon 
the statute in which it appears, allowed one or two houses of 
Congress to veto designated administrative actions.120 The stated 
rationale was that the legislative veto cuts the President out of 
legislative actions in contravention of the Article I legislative pro-
cess, which involves the House, the Senate, and the President.121 
Yet, as Justice Byron White argued in dissent, the legislative 
veto was being struck because it delegates legislative power to 
                                                                                                        
 113. Id. at 671–88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 114. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543–44 (1981) (Rehnquist, 
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a process other than that of Article I,122 but that reasoning 
would also invalidate delegation of lawmaking authority to 
agencies.123 The Loving dicta did, however, hint that Chadha 
could be viewed as, in part, a delegation case. 
Similarly, in Clinton v. City of New York124 decided in 1998, 
Justices from the left and right joined in striking down the line-
item veto, which allowed the President to reject line items in 
appropriations statutes.125 The Court reasoned that this proce-
dure contravened Article I’s legislative process, which limits 
the President to accepting or not the entire bill passed by the 
House and the Senate.126 Yet, the line-item veto could also be 
conceived as delegating some of Congress’s power over ap-
propriations to the President acting alone. Concerns of practi-
cality were no barrier in striking a delegation of the appropria-
tions power because Congress likes to hand out the money 
itself. Spending, after all, usually brings credit to its members. 
In contrast, Congress often delegates the power to impose rules 
of private conduct because they bring blame as well as credit. 
Thus, the Court faced a case fraught with more political and 
practical difficulty in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns127 
decided in 2001, in which trade associations had argued that a 
popular regulatory statute, the Clean Air Act, unconstitutionally 
delegated legislative power.128 Specifically, they argued the 
“protect the public health” provision delegated legislative 
power because it gave no guidance as to the extent to which the 
agency must protect health.129 A D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
panel had held that the Clean Air Act as construed by the 
agency did delegate power unconstitutionally.130 
                                                                                                        
 122. Id. at 984–89 (White, J., dissenting). 
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In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court stated that the text 
of the Constitution “permits no delegation of [legislative] pow-
ers.”131 Yet, having seemingly vowed that the Court would stop 
Congress from abdicating its legislative power, the Court trivi-
alized that vow by stating, “we repeatedly have said that when 
Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies 
Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible prin-
ciple to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed 
to conform.’”132 Indeed, the opinion, like Justice Kagan’s opin-
ion for the Court in Gundy quoted earlier, noted that even goals 
as mushy as “the public interest” had counted as an “intelligi-
ble principle.”133 The opinion concluded by stating that “we 
have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress re-
garding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be 
left to those executing or applying the law.’”134 The quotation is 
from an earlier opinion in which Justice Scalia argued that “in-
telligible principle” was not a judicially manageable test.135 In 
effect, Whitman allows members of Congress to judge whether 
they have made themselves sufficiently responsible to their 
constituents, despite their self-interest in avoiding responsibil-
ity.136 In sum, when it comes to the rules of private conduct, the 
consent-of-the-governed norm has become a farce. 
                                                                                                        
saved through a narrowing interpretation, but rather than narrowing the interpre-
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States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). 
 133. Id. at 474. 
 134. Id. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)) (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 (majority opinion)). 
 135. Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). This 
passage was cited with approval in the Court’s opinion in Gundy v. United States. 
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019). 
 136. American Trucking could have won a minor victory for the constitutional norm 
along the lines of Benzene by adopting the argument that Professor Marci Hamilton 
and I advanced in an amicus brief. Brief of the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc. et 
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B. The Impediments Today 
Believing that Congress cannot fully comply with the con-
sent-of-the-governed norm, the Court has concluded that it 
cannot enforce the norm as originally understood.137 Many, if 
not most, of the regulatory statutes in the United States Code 
would fail to comply with the norm as originally understood.138 
The Court, of course, purports to limit delegation through 
the “intelligible principle” test, but it is judicially unmanagea-
ble and so no limit on delegation in practice. Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissent in Gundy suggests important strides in the direction of 
the Court overcoming this impediment to enforcing the norm. 
His dissent calls for discarding the “intelligible principle” test, 
which he calls a “misadventure,”139 and replacing it with a ju-
dicially manageable test. The dissent also recognizes that Chief 
Justice Marshall’s 1825 opinion in Wayman v. Southard could 
provide precedential support for such a test.140 Justice Gorsuch 
writes that Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion “distinguished be-
tween those ‘important subjects, which must be entirely regu-
lated by the legislature itself,’ and ‘those of less interest, in 
which a general provision may be made, and power given to 
                                                                                                        
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99-
1257). We argued that to reduce the scope of the delegation, the statute should be 
construed to require the agency to set the standard to protect against harms to 
health that it found to be significant and in the rulemaking it had expressly re-
fused to make such a finding. Id. at 15–20. There was strong support for this read-
ing of the statute in its legislative history. Id. Seemingly driven by profits more 
than constitutional principle, American Trucking preferred to argue that the stat-
ute be construed to minimize costs to its members. See David Schoenbrod, Politics 
and the Principle That Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 239, 270–75 (2003). Professor Hamilton and I filed amicus briefs on the del-
egation issue in Clinton, Loving, and other cases. 
 137. As stated in Mistretta v. United States, “[I]n our increasingly complex society, 
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot 
do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” 488 
U.S. at 372. 
 138. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 
327 (1987). Even if such a ruling were made prospective, Congress and agencies 
would have to struggle to meet the need for ongoing changes in statutes and 
regulations. 
 139. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 140. See id. at 2135–36 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 
(1825)). Justice Gorsuch omitted Chief Justice Marshall’s reference to “minor regu-
lations.” Id.; Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 45. 
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those who are to act . . . to fill up the details.’”141 The dissent 
goes on to make a convincing case that the statutory provision 
at issue in Gundy left far more than details to the delegate.142 
Nonetheless, additional strides are needed before the test 
discussed in the dissent would be a workable test for a majority. 
If Justice Gorsuch had been writing for the Court, his use of the 
statutory-invalidation guillotine would threaten huge swathes 
of the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. 
His test would be a threat because it would be hard to know in 
advance how the Court would draw the line between “im-
portant subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legis-
lature itself,” and “those of less interest, in which a general 
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to 
act . . . to fill up the details.”143 This formulation leaves many 
questions open. Does the test mean that Congress must state 
the more important rules, the more important goals, or some 
combination thereof? Whichever it is, it would also be unclear 
how to define the level of importance. Indeed, it would be 
much more difficult to construct a judicially manageable test 
along these lines in 2020 than it would have been in the simpler 
world of 1825. 
Even if the Court could construct a judicially manageable test 
along the lines that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent suggests, doing so 
would take many years of case-by-case adjudication. Mean-
while, federal regulators as well as businesses, state and local 
governments, nonprofits, and others subject to federal regulation 
have come to rely upon regulation as we now have it. More 
agencies with more power have produced a Code of Federal 
Regulations with twelve times more words than it had when 
first codified in 1938.144 The reliance is massive. 
During the years of uncertainty that Justice Gorsuch’s test 
would produce, stakeholders would have to predict which 
regulations would be found valid and which would not. The 
uncertainty would plague both large organizations and smaller 
organizations and individuals without ready access to legal 
                                                                                                        
 141. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (omission in original) 
(quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43). 
 142. See id. at 2143–48. 
 143. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. 
 144. Email from Ethan Clarkson, Research Assistant, N.Y. Law Sch., to author 
(Oct. 10, 2019) (on file with author). 
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advice. After all, individuals who farm, practice dentistry on 
their own, or operate gas stations, to name just some examples, 
are subject to many federal regulations. The approval process 
for many projects, big and small, could take much longer than 
it does now. On top of the uncertain status of old regulations 
would come uncertainty in issuing new ones.145 All this uncer-
tainty would harm the economy generally. Meanwhile, advo-
cates for various regulatory causes would upset voters by say-
ing that the Court had stripped them of essential regulatory 
protection.146 
To avert such a catastrophe, the Court would need to explain 
to the governed and elected officials how to transition to what 
most of the people want—regulatory protection that is both 
workable and subject to the consent of the governed. I will 
suggest how the Court could do so but first will discuss what 
Congress should do on its own. 
III. CONGRESS FLOUTS THE NORM 
A. Congress’s Duty to Comply with the 
Norm to the Extent Practical 
Even if impediments prevent even partial judicial enforce-
ment of the consent-of-the-governed norm, members of Congress 
are honor bound to do their best to comply with it. As Dean 
Lawrence Sager argues in an article on underenforced constitu-
tional norms, “[C]onstitutional norms which are underenforced 
by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid 
to their full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions 
which stop short of these limits should be understood as delin-
                                                                                                        
 145. However, Justice Gorsuch suggests, “Congress can also commission agen-
cies or other experts to study and recommend legislative language.” Gundy, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Yes, it might, but his optimism takes no ac-
count of the gridlock in Congress. 
 146. All the uncertainty and upset would arouse political antagonism against 
the Court and so add to the current speculation about court packing. James Freeman, 
Opinion, Justice Ginsburg Kicks Buttigieg, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/justice-ginsburg-kicks-buttigieg-11564084993 [https://perma.cc/
8NMJ-N7JM]. Indeed, four aspirants to the Democratic Party’s nomination for 
President—Mayor Pete Buttigieg and Senators Kirsten Gillibrand, Kamala Harris, 
and Elizabeth Warren—say they are open to court packing. Id. 
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eating only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforc-
ing the norm . . . .”147 
Dean Sager also calls for courts to distinguish norms from 
the impediments to their full enforcement.148 He illustrates the 
distinction with the “equal protection” norm,149 which he de-
fines this way: “A state may treat people differently only when 
it is fair to do so.”150 The impediment to its full enforcement is 
that federal courts should not second guess policy decisions the 
Constitution assigns to states.151 To accommodate this impedi-
ment, federal courts developed a test for judicial enforcement 
that differs from the equal protection norm: an inequality is 
permitted if it bears a “rational relationship” to the govern-
ment’s justification for it, unless the inequality involves a dubi-
ous classification such as race.152 This test ends up crediting 
some pretextual justifications, thus permitting some unfair 
inequalities. Dean Sager shows that by recognizing that the 
rational relationship test allows some violations of the equal 
protection norm, federal courts can allow state courts and 
Congress, which do not face the same impediment as do the 
federal courts, to augment the federal courts’ incomplete en-
forcement.153 Thus, the norm and the test for its judicial en-
forcement differ. As Professor Thomas Nachbar writes, “There 
is no textual basis in the Constitution to justify reviewing legis-
lation for its rationality.”154 
                                                                                                        
 147. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Con-
stitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978). Dean Sager also states the 
following: 
This obligation to obey constitutional norms at their unenforced margins 
requires governmental officials to fashion their own conceptions of these 
norms and measure their conduct by reference to these conceptions. 
Public officials cannot consider themselves free to act at what they 
perceive or ought to perceive to be peril to constitutional norms merely 
because the federal judiciary is unable to enforce these norms at their 
margins. 
Id. at 1227. 
 148. Id. at 1212. 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 150. Sager, supra note 147, at 1215, 1263–64 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151. See id. at 1216. 
 152. See id. at 1216–17. 
 153. See id. at 1212. 
 154. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 
1627, 1630 (2016). 
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Dean Sager’s article does not discuss the underenforced 
consent-of-the-governed norm.155 He did write, however, that a 
norm’s status as underenforced is “particularly apparent when 
the absence of ‘judicially manageable standards’ is cited as a 
reason for the invocation of the political question doctrine.”156 
This is a reason that the Court gives for underenforcing the 
consent-of-the-governed norm.157 
Because, as Dean Sager argues, underenforced norms are valid 
to their full conceptual limits and the consent-of-the-governed 
norm bars delegation of the power to make rules of private 
conduct, Congress should do its best to take direct responsibil-
ity for such rules. Congress would aim too low if it sought to 
provide no more than an insipid “intelligible principle.” 
B. Congress Could Comply with the 
Norm to a Substantial Extent 
Congress could do much more than it now does to comply 
with the consent-of-the-governed norm. One way that Congress 
could shoulder more of its constitutional responsibility while 
still making use of agency expertise was suggested by James 
Landis, once the New Deal’s leading expert on administrative 
law and later dean of Harvard Law School. He suggested that 
Congress could require new “administrative action . . . of large 
significance” not take effect until Congress explicitly approves 
it.158 He wrote that for administrative officials, “it was an act of 
                                                                                                        
 155. Whether the ultimate reason for underenforcement of a norm is an institu-
tional constraint on the courts or on Congress, the consent of the governed should 
be viewed as an underenforced constitutional norm. See Sager, supra note 147, at 
1227. A search of law reviews found seven publications that both cited Dean 
Sager’s article and mentioned the “delegation doctrine” or “nondelegation.” 
Email from William Mills, Professor & Assoc. Librarian, N.Y. Law Sch., to author 
(Nov. 30, 2018) (on file with author). None of these publications discussed the 
possibility of using Dean Sager’s recommendations to improve enforcement of the 
consent-of-the-governed norm. Id. 
 156. Sager, supra note 147, at 1226. 
 157. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001). The 
reliance on the lack of a judicially manageable standard is clearer in the opinion 
that the Court quotes there, Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 158. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 77, 79 (1938). Landis alter-
natively suggested the legislative veto, which was struck down in Chadha. Id. at 77. 
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political wisdom to put back upon the shoulders of Congress” 
responsibility for such actions.159 
In 1984, Stephen Breyer, then a court of appeals judge, 
showed how Congress could structure a statute to efficiently im-
plement Dean Landis’s idea.160 The statute would force Congress 
to vote on bills to approve agency actions.161 If approved by 
both houses, the bill would be presented to the President for 
signature, thus avoiding the objection that doomed the legisla-
tive veto in Chadha.162 The statute would set deadlines by which 
the House and Senate must vote, limit debate, and bar filibusters 
on such votes.163 Instead of using gridlock or statutes mouthing 
platitudinous goals to avoid responsibility for hard choices, the 
legislators would have to vote on specific regulations. 
Then-Judge Breyer framed his proposal as a way for Congress 
to reclaim the power that it lost when Chadha struck down the 
legislative veto and so confined it to actions previously subject 
to a legislative veto.164 To serve the purpose of the consent-of-
the-governed norm, it would be better to aim the proposal at 
significant regulations. The proposal could target regulations 
defined as “significant regulatory action” for the purpose of 
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 
the Office of Management and Budget.165 There would be about 
as many such regulations as current votes on symbolic public 
laws such as those naming post offices.166 President William 
Clinton issued the executive order containing the current defini-
tion, and it has remained largely unchanged under Presidents 
George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump.167 Voting 
                                                                                                        
 159. Id. at 76. 
 160. Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 793–96 (1984). 
 161. Id. at 794. 
 162. Id. at 793. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 793. 
 165. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641–42 (1994), reprinted as 
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012). President Clinton’s executive order was in 
turn a variation on one issued by President Reagan. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 
C.F.R. 127 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638. 
 166. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 153. 
 167. See Exec. Order No. 13,789, § 2(a)(iii), 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317, 19,317 (Apr. 21, 
2017) (same); Exec. Order No. 13,609, § 4(f), 3 C.F.R. 255, 257 (2013) (referencing 
the definition in President Clinton’s executive order); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 
C.F.R. 191 (2008) (implicitly using the same definition by not altering the original 
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on significant regulations would require legislators to shoulder 
more responsibility than voting on the names of post offices, 
but the Constitution includes voting on regulatory rules in 
Congress’s job description, not naming post offices. 
Members of Congress could find the time for such work. 
Starting with House Speaker Newt Gingrich in the late 1990s, 
congressional leaders began to push their members to spend 
most of their time back home in their districts to, in effect, 
campaign for reelection, reserving only two to three days per 
week in Washington and only in weeks when Congress is in 
session. Moreover, even when in Washington, party leaders 
push their members to spend far more time raising campaign 
contributions (much of which are donated to the party leaders’ 
war chests) and campaigning for reelection rather than work-
ing on legislation.168 The upshot is that most “lawmakers” 
spend much less time lawmaking than many weekend golfers 
spend golfing.169 Were members of Congress responsible for 
regulations, however, even party leaders would want them to 
spend more time considering the regulations on which they 
would cast votes. In voting on regulations, members of Congress 
and their staffs would have the benefit of the agency’s rule-
making record. 
There will, of course, sometimes be major fights over regula-
tions in Congress, but that is where the fighting is supposed to 
be. Congress passing the buck does not stop the fights but rather 
displaces them to other venues, such as hearings over the con-
firmation of judicial nominees.170 
The statute implementing the Landis-Breyer proposal should 
make clear that a bill on a regulation would approve the agency’s 
promulgation of it rather than enact it.171 That way, the regula-
tion once approved would still be subject to judicial review, 
                                                                                                        
definition), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 note (2012). 
 168. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 89–90. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Ben Sasse, Sasse on Kavanaugh Hearing: 
“We Can And We Should Do Better Than This” (Sept. 4, 2018), https://
www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/9/sasse-on-kavanaugh-hearing-we-
can-and-we-should-do-better-than-this [https://perma.cc/C9Z9-56SN]. 
 171. See David Schoenbrod, Responsibility for Regulation Act, DC-CONFIDENTIAL.ORG 
(2019), https://www.dc-confidential.org/responsibility-regulation-act/ [https://
perma.cc/D9WB-WSFN] (outlining such a bill). 
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especially on whether the agency acted within its statutory au-
thority.172 Moreover, the agency could amend the regulation on 
its own if the amendment is not so important as to constitute 
“significant regulatory action.” 
It may seem strange that a regulation reviewed by both 
houses of Congress and the President could be reviewed again 
by a court or amended by an agency. Recall, however, that the 
legislative process has approved the agency’s promulgation of 
the regulation rather than enacted the regulation. Surely, 
Congress can approve the promulgation of a single, known 
regulation when it now has on the books statutes that approve 
in advance and wholesale the promulgation of future, and thus 
unknown, regulations. The former, by making Congress ac-
countable, complies with the consent-of-the-governed norm. 
Moreover, Congress is within its power to approve an action 
for one purpose but leave it to the courts to decide its legality 
for other purposes. For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority 
v. Hill,173 the Supreme Court rejected the Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s argument that Congress’s appropriation of money 
to build the Tellico Dam insulated the project from objection 
under the Endangered Species Act.174 
Judicial review is desirable because otherwise an agency 
could increase its own statutory authority by gaining congres-
sional approval of a regulation exceeding its previous authority 
under the enabling statute. Such increase of authority would 
shift the initiative in increasing agency authority from Congress 
to agencies. Moreover, growing the agencies’ authority implicitly 
by Congress approving a regulation would create uncertainty as 
to the scope of agencies’ authority in issuing later regulations.175 
For a final wrinkle, the statute might approve the promulga-
tion of all earlier regulations. Such wholesale approval would 
                                                                                                        
 172. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2018). 
 173. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 174. See id. at 172–73, 189–90. In this case, the Court used tools of statutory con-
struction to find that Congress did not intend to insulate the dam from scrutiny 
under the Endangered Species Act. See id. at 188. The statute implementing the 
Landis-Breyer proposal could make the courts’ work easier by stating explicitly 
that judicial review would be preserved. No Justice in TVA v. Hill opined that 
Congress could not decide one issue (appropriation) and leave another issue un-
resolved (whether building the dam violated the Endangered Species Act). 
 175. For more on the desirability of preserving judicial review, see Schoenbrod, 
supra note 171. 
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not do much to make members of Congress accountable for 
any old regulation but would acknowledge Congress’s failure 
to do its duty for many decades and so be an initial step to-
ward atonement. The wholesale approval would also shield the 
old regulations from challenge on consent-of-the-governed 
grounds and thereby greatly reduce the uncertainty and upset 
that would arise if the Court began to enforce this norm as to 
significant regulations. 
C. How Flouting the Norm Benefits Legislators Politically 
Let us call the resulting statute the Responsibility for Regulation 
Act. Congress has failed to adopt a statute forcing it to comply 
substantially with the consent-of-the-governed norm because 
the legislators do not want the responsibility. Consider what 
happened after some members asked me in 1995 to help design 
a bill that would increase Congress’s responsibility for regula-
tions. I suggested the Landis-Breyer proposal. The result was a 
bill that members of both parties introduced called the Con-
gressional Responsibility Act.176 
When the bill began to get support, the growing possibility 
of its passage worried party leaders because legislators would 
end up with responsibility for hard choices. To avoid responsi-
bility while assuaging popular opinion calling for it, Congress 
passed in 1996 a sound-alike bill, the Congressional Review 
Act, and President Clinton signed it.177 It gives Congress the 
option of voting on regulations, but not surprisingly the legis-
lators hardly ever opt to take that responsibility. All but one of 
the exceptions came after the Obama Administration postponed 
controversial regulations until after the 2016 election to avoid 
angering voters before they went to the polls and, assumedly, 
elected Hillary Clinton.178 As a result, the Obama Administration 
failed to give Congress notice of many regulations in time to 
safeguard them from annulment by the Republican President 
                                                                                                        
 176. Congressional Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. This bill, 
unlike my present proposal, was not limited to significant regulations. 
 177. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2018). 
 178. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 190–91, 243–44 (2018); Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional 
Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2162 (2009) (describing the Bush Administration’s 
use of the Congressional Review Act to overturn the Clinton Administration’s 
ergonomics rule). 
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and Congress that took over in 2017.179 Yet, the leaders of the 
Republican majorities in Congress allowed votes on only that 
small portion of these vulnerable regulations that would not 
require their members to make hard choices.180 
Long before 2017, however, it became apparent that the 
Congressional Review Act failed to make elected lawmakers re-
sponsible to voters. To ward off blame for failing to take responsi-
bility for regulations, Republicans in the House have repeatedly 
passed a bill based in part upon the original Congressional 
Responsibility Act.181 Unfortunately, the new bill is another 
sham, starting with its new title, Regulations from the Executive 
in Need of Scrutiny (REINS). The title suggests that the regula-
tions stem from overzealous agencies despite the many statutes 
requiring agencies to promulgate regulations. Worse still, the 
bill is full of poison pills that ensure it will never get significant 
Democratic support, thus making its enactment improbable.182 
Indeed, of the thirty-nine cosponsors of the bill in the Senate in 
the 115th Congress, none was a Democrat.183 The upshot is that 
                                                                                                        
 179. See Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump is rolling back Obama’s legacy, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/
trump-rolling-back-obama-rules/?utm_term=.c0ae88396f22 [https://perma.cc/R6V5-
FYE6]. 
 180. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, McConnell Promised to End Senate Gridlock. Instead, 
Republicans Are Stuck in Neutral., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
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 181. See Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act of 
2017, H.R. 26, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, Jan. 5, 2017). 
 182. One poison pill: all existing regulations would expire in ten years unless 
expressly approved by Congress. Id. § 809(b). Moreover, the bill lacks realistic 
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approval when the same Congress failed to approve another regulation on the 
same subject. Id. § 801(a)(5). So, if the agency discovers that a rejected regulation 
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present a new version to the same Congress. That would keep majorities in both 
houses from approving a regulation they would otherwise support. This is an-
tiregulation rather than pro-responsibility. I discuss another poison pill in the text. 
 183. See S.21–Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, CON-
GRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/21/cosponsors 
[https://perma.cc/MYN6-ZGSH] (last visited Oct. 13, 2019). 
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REINS’s sponsors can contend that they want to be responsible 
without ever having to take responsibility. 
One poison pill requires agencies to cut the cost of existing 
regulations to offset the cost of new regulations.184 So, even if 
REINS were enacted, Republican legislators could take credit 
with their party’s base for wanting to control regulatory costs 
while shifting blame to agencies for any reduction in regulatory 
protection. Meanwhile, so long as some version of the Landis-
Breyer approach is not enacted, the Democrats who support 
existing regulatory statutes can take credit with their party’s 
base for wanting regulatory protection while shifting blame to 
agencies for the regulatory burdens. This stalemate is a perfect 
recipe for polarization. 
If either the Democratic or Republican leaders in Congress 
really wanted to submit to “the consent of the governed,” they 
could introduce a bill that strips the REINS Act of its poison 
pills, make clear that it applies to regulations reducing or 
increasing regulatory protection, and give it a new title. One 
example would be the Responsibility for Regulation Act de-
scribed in Part III.B. 
Such a statute would make Congress a more functional, less 
polarized legislature. In voting on specific regulations, mem-
bers would have to take responsibility for both the level of reg-
ulatory protection and the level of regulatory burdens. So, they 
would have to face hard choices about trade-offs instead of 
simply spouting slogans about polarizing positions. Now, in 
contrast, majority leaders of both parties try to keep hard choices 
off the floor in Congress. For example, former Republican House 
Majority Leader Dennis Hastert adopted the so-called Hastert 
Rule that prevented a bill from reaching the floor unless it was 
supported by a majority of the majority party.185 The Democrats, 
for their part, are adept at structuring bills and designing pro-
cedures to hide the hard choices.186 
                                                                                                        
 184. H.R. 26 § 808. 
 185. See MICKEY EDWARDS, THE PARTIES VERSUS THE PEOPLE: HOW TO TURN 
REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS INTO AMERICANS 104 (2012). 
 186. For example, the Democratic bill to cut emissions of climate change gases 
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ling climate change. See David Schoenbrod & Richard B. Stewart, Opinion, The 
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The extra time members of Congress would need to spend 
on lawmaking in Washington to grapple with the hard choices 
would be of benefit because, working in Washington only a 
couple of days a week, members hardly get to know members 
of the other party.187 In contrast, before the 1990s, Congress 
worked longer in Washington, and members and their families 
lived in Washington and got to know each other, socially as 
well as at work.188 Respected observers of Congress argue that its 
members and their families spending more time in Washington 
would reduce the nastiness and gridlock that makes Congress 
so dysfunctional.189 
In sum, by taking responsibility for regulation, members of 
Congress would have to make hard choices but would gain 
personally to the extent they ran for office to have the satisfac-
tion of serving their community. Given our understandably 
jaundiced view of politicians, it is difficult to bear in mind what 
psychology shows: that evolution has led most people to want 
to do the right thing (as well as benefit themselves personally) 
and this is so across the political spectrum, although our views 
of what is right differ.190 Yet, members of Congress cannot be 
knights questing to serve the public because the current regime 
forces them to be pawns in the campaign of their party’s lead-
ers to become and stay the leaders of the majority.191 As col-
umnist Peggy Noonan recently wrote, “Congress knows how 
hapless it looks, how riven by partisanship and skins-vs.-shirts 
dumbness. For many of them it takes the tang out of things. 
They know it lowers their standing in America. They grieve it. 
                                                                                                        
said that “we have to pass the [health care] bill so that you can find out what’s in 
it,” but later asserted that she was misunderstood. See Jonathan Capehart, Opinion, 
Pelosi defends her infamous health care remark, WASH. POST (June 20, 2012), https://
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 187. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 89, 94. 
 188. Id. at 93–94. 
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 190. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE 
ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012). 
 191. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: POLARIZATION, 
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It embarrasses them. They’d like to be part of something that 
works, something respected.”192 
D. How Flouting the Norm Harms 
the Legislators’ Constituents 
Many people believe the public is better served when agen-
cies rather than Congress run regulation.193 This belief is under-
standable because Congress is less knowledgeable than the 
agencies and given to posturing or worse. However, the choice 
is not between the agencies or Congress running regulation but 
rather whether Congress will bear responsibility for the im-
portant role it now plays in regulation. 
Most current regulatory statutes order agencies to deliver 
popular promises, such as health protection, but nonetheless 
sidestep the hard choices.194 That way, the members of Congress 
get much of the credit for the popular promises, and the agency 
gets much of the blame for the burdens needed to deliver on 
the promises and the failures to deliver.195 
Take, for example, the pollution that came from refiners adding 
lead additives to gasoline. The statute enacted in 1970 prom-
ised that health would be protected from lead completely by 
1976.196 As an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense 
Council in the 1970s, I won cases that aimed to push the EPA to 
do its duty of achieving this goal. Nonetheless, because of pres-
sure on the agency from politicians on both the left and right, 
the EPA, during both Democratic and Republican administra-
tions, failed to act vigorously to abate the health effects of lead 
in gasoline until the mid-1980s and then only after the big oil 
refiners found that they could save money if lead additives to 
gasoline were banned.197 
                                                                                                        
 192. Peggy Noonan, Opinion, Elijah Cummings and the Little Sisters, WALL ST. J. 
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 193. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2018) (arguing that the traditional nondelegation doc-
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knowledge of the agencies). 
 194. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 43. 
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 197. On the lead litigation and its consequences, see generally SCHOENBROD, 
supra note 42, at 29–38. 
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To put the consequences in perspective, consider that in 
2016, President Obama declared a state of emergency because 
nearly one-twentieth of the children aged five and under of 
Flint, Michigan, had blood lead levels of at least five mi-
crograms.198 In the 1970s, the average blood lead level in chil-
dren across the United States was three times that level.199 Back 
in the 1970s, medical experts told me that, although lead in 
paint caused fatally high lead levels in some children, the pop-
ulation-wide contamination came primarily from lead in gaso-
line. Congress’s unqualified promise that the Clean Air Act 
would “protect health” was a pious fraud. 
I began to wonder what would have happened if Congress 
had itself enacted the rule that would set the pace at which to 
cut lead in gasoline. Doing nothing on lead was not an option 
because in 1970 “Get the Lead Out,” as some bumper stickers 
read, was a popular demand.200 Congress itself, in a singular 
exception to the statute’s general flight from responsibility, de-
cided that new cars had to emit 90 percent less of a list of pollu-
tants by 1975 but left lead off the list.201 The statute instead or-
dered the EPA to fully protect health from airborne lead by 
1976.202 If Congress could not have passed the buck on lead, it 
would have required, I estimated, at least a 50 percent cut in 
the amount of lead in gasoline by 1975.203 Using the EPA health 
data, I showed that this quicker start on lead would have 
averted about 50,000 deaths in the United States, about equal to 
American deaths in the Vietnam War.204 
It is, of course, politically profitable for Congress to issue 
statutory orders to agencies that allow legislators to take credit 
but shift blame—so politically profitable that Congress radically 
increased the number of orders to the EPA in the 1990 version 
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than Flint, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016, 5:53 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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of the Clean Air Act. The phrase “the administrator . . . shall” 
appears 940 times.205 Many of the orders must be performed 
repeatedly. The orders are lengthy, which helps explain why 
the statute’s text would fill a 450-page book. Long statutes full 
of complicated orders are not unusual.206 
The legislators are sufficiently skilled to issue many lengthy 
orders, yet still avoid blame for the hard choices. For example, 
when President Obama’s EPA issued a new ozone standard 
under the statutory mandate to “protect health” from air pollu-
tants in 2015, Democratic legislators could criticize the regulation 
as insufficiently tough on pollution and Republican legislators 
could criticize the regulation as too tough on the economy.207 
One result of such narrow delegation is extraordinary com-
plication. As said of the Clean Air Act by Gina McCarthy, 
whom President Obama appointed assistant administrator of 
EPA and then administrator, “[E]ach sector has 17 to 20 rules 
that govern each piece of equipment and you’ve got to be a 
neuroscientist to figure it out.”208 The complication requires big 
business to hire staffs of costly experts and suffer even more 
costly delays in getting permits. The consequences are worse 
for smaller businesses, farmers, state and local governments, 
and other entities subject to federal regulation but less able to 
afford the experts. 
Another result is that the statutes’ orders grow obsolete 
quickly because they are based upon circumstances and under-
standings that change.209 Yet, because the statutes were de-
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signed to shift blame to the agencies, members of Congress 
have no incentive to revise the statutes, even as they grow in-
creasingly dysfunctional for their constituents.210 
Consider Congress’s failure to update the environmental 
statutes, almost none of which have been amended for nearly 
three decades despite rapid changes in our understanding of 
environmental problems and how to deal with them.211 In a 
project organized by New York Law School and New York 
University School of Law in 2007, some fifty environmental law 
experts from across the ideological spectrum set out to show 
Congress how to update these obsolete statutes. The pro-
ject’s leaders—Professor Richard Stewart, former chair of the 
Environmental Defense Fund, his colleague on the New York 
University faculty, Professor Katrina Wyman, and I—
summarized the results in a book, Breaking the Logjam: Envi-
ronmental Protection That Will Work.212 The focus was on how to 
get more environmental protection at lower cost rather than 
how clean is clean enough. Our proposals included greater use 
of market-based alternatives instead of inefficient command-
and-control regulation, leaving essentially local issues to state 
and local government, and imposing direct federal regulation 
of national issues such as interstate pollution. 
Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill told us in private 
they wished our reforms were already in the statutes, but that 
Congress would not enact them because doing so would require 
legislators to take responsibility. So, for example, Congress did 
not adopt the Breaking the Logjam proposal to deal with the 
large stationary sources of interstate major pollutants by enact-
ing a national cap-and-trade system.213 That system would 
make it profitable to invent and use less expensive ways to cut 
pollution.214 Instead, the current statute requires the EPA to tell 
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the upwind states to limit pollution sufficiently to reduce harm 
in downwind states.215 
This wackadoodle system serves members of Congress by in-
terposing the EPA and state officials between them and their 
constituents, all while making pollution control more expen-
sive. The current system results in more pollution that kills 
constituents. During the Obama Administration, the EPA calcu-
lated that the existing statute would halve ozone and particu-
late pollution, which are the major air pollution killers, thereby 
adding six months to the lifespan of the average American. A 
congressionally imposed national cap-and-trade system could 
easily halve the pollution again and, based upon the EPA’s 
health analysis, add another three months to the average life.216 
So, the average young person will die a quarter year sooner 
under the current statute. 
In sum, with Congress exerting power over agencies, the 
choice is no longer whether experts in agencies or legislators 
should run regulation. Rather, the choice is whether Congress 
shall bear responsibility for its role in regulation. By delegating 
the legislative power to make regulatory law, members of 
Congress evade responsibility for how they wield power and, 
as a result, wield it irresponsibly.217 
Consider how the incentives of members of Congress would 
change if they had to vote on regulations. They would then 
bear personal responsibility for the failure to deliver popular 
benefits and the imposition of unpopular burdens. A challenger 
in a future election could then blame the incumbent for inflict-
ing bad consequences on voters. It is recorded votes on rules—
not debate, sound bites, or votes for popular goals—that would 
make members of Congress responsible for regulations in fu-
ture elections. The upshot: although the legislators themselves 
would spend much less time on each regulation than does the 
agency and voters would not read the regulations, the legisla-
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tors would still fear the blame that they might come to bear for 
the consequences of their votes in the next election, or the next, 
or the next. 
As Dean Landis wrote, his suggestion would “have the ad-
ministrative as the technical agent in the initiation of rules of 
conduct, yet at the same time to have the legislative share in 
the responsibility for their adoption.”218 Responsibility for sig-
nificant regulation would better align the interests of legislators 
and their constituents. With legislators bearing responsibility 
for the consequences of regulation for constituents, more of the 
skill that the legislators now employ to make themselves look 
good would be put in service of producing regulations that bet-
ter please their constituents. Agency experts would become 
Congress’s allies in showing how to update statutes to allow 
agencies to promulgate regulations that produce better conse-
quences for constituents. In sum, the interests of the legislators 
and their constituents would be better aligned. 
Congress will not, of course, construct a monument in 
memory of the 50,000 victims of its failure on lead in gasoline 
even though it funded a monument in memory of the like 
number of American service members who died in the Vietnam 
War. Nor will it build monuments for the millions of other vic-
tims of its shirking. The Court should start to do its job and 
thereby stop endorsing Congress’s pious frauds. 
IV. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD DO 
A. The Court’s Job 
A book published in May 2019 by Professor Lawrence Lessig, 
Fidelity & Constraint: How the Supreme Court Has Read the American 
Constitution,219 helps show how the Court could, and why it 
should, substantially enforce the consent-of-the-governed 
norm. In its almost 600 pages, the book provides a model of 
“the practice of the Supreme Court as it has interpreted our 
Constitution” that explains the work of Justices from across the 
ideological spectrum from the early years to modern times.220 
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The model has two parts: “fidelity to meaning,” referring to 
the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions, and “fidelity to 
role,” referring to the constraints on the enforcement of that 
meaning imposed by the Court’s role in a republic.221 Professor 
Lessig writes that decisions prompted by constraints “are in-
stances of infidelity (to meaning) in order to preserve or enable 
the capacity of the judicial institution more generally.”222 
Professor Lessig does not himself apply this model to the 
consent-of-the-governed norm. Nonetheless, his analysis of fi-
delity to role is applicable to the impediments to that norm’s 
enforcement.223 
The first impediment to full enforcement of the norm dis-
cussed in Part II is the inability of Congress to make all the 
federal rules of private conduct and thereby to fully conform 
to the original meaning of the norm. The Court requiring the 
impossible of Congress would jeopardize the authority of 
the Court.224 Originalists could avoid this impossibility by 
recognizing such impracticality as an impediment to judicial 
enforcement.225 
The second impediment to enforcement discussed in Part II 
is the lack of a judicially manageable test. Professor Lessig 
states the Court bows out when it lacks a judicially manageable 
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test because otherwise it would seem to be acting politically, 
thereby jeopardizing its credibility as a judicial institution.226 
The state-the-rule definition of the norm is judicially managea-
ble because it rides on a difference of kind (lawmaking versus 
law interpretation and application), but the “intelligible princi-
ple” test is not.227 The question is whether the Justices can come 
up with a judicially manageable way to deal with the first im-
pediment. The answer will be discussed in Part IV.B. 
The third impediment discussed in Part II is strong public 
opinion in favor of delegation. As was shown, there is no such 
strong opinion now. When overwhelming political opposition 
does exist, however, it is another constraint, according to 
Professor Lessig.228 That the Court would back down in the face of 
political opposition may seem strange given that the Constitution 
is supposedly counter-majoritarian. That is why Professor Lessig 
notes, “It is in [the nature of this constraint] that its nature can-
not be announced.”229 
Professor Lessig goes on to state that because political oppo-
sition sufficient to make the Court suppress the meaning of the 
Constitution “was a kind of force majeure, then it follows that 
when the force is removed, the obligation to return to the 
Constitution’s . . . meaning returns as well.”230 
The fourth impediment to enforcement of the consent-of-the-
governed norm discussed in Part II is reliance on Congress’s 
ability to delegate. The four impediments are related. The judi-
cially unmanageable “intelligible principle” test was adopted 
as a way of avoiding giving Congress an impossible task, and 
in turn, it built reliance on the current regulatory system. The 
Court’s attempt to enforce the norm without showing how to 
cope with that reliance could then result in overwhelming po-
litical opposition. 
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Professor Lessig shows that the Court has repeatedly adopted 
new ways to better enforce constitutional norms.231 As he ar-
gues, “[W]hat a court needs when it recognizes failure is the 
freedom to try again: ‘Our aim is to preserve X. We have tried 
techniques A and B; they’ve proven too costly. We’ll now try 
C.’”232 To enforce the consent-of-the-governed norm, the Court 
needs a judicially manageable test with which Congress could 
comply and a way to take account of reliance on the current 
regulatory system. 
Searching for such a test is the Court’s job. The search can 
succeed. 
B. How the Court Could Do Its Job 
The design of such a test, and the choice of how Congress 
would comply with it, will have policy implications. To avoid 
intruding into policy more than necessary to enforce constitu-
tional norms, courts often try to get political branches to tackle 
such policy choices in a way that is consistent with the norms 
before themselves taking more intrusive action.233 So, in cases 
where legislative districting violates the one-person, one-vote 
norm, courts give the state legislature an opportunity to reap-
portion the districts—a decision with profound effects on who 
gets elected—in a way that complies with the Constitution. As 
the Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims,234 “[J]udicial relief becomes 
appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion accord-
ing to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after 
having had an adequate opportunity to do so.”235 
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The upshot from giving elected officials a chance can be, if all 
goes well, a division of labor in which the elected officials 
make most of the policy choices and the judges stick largely to 
enforcing rights. This approach might help the Court get 
Congress to take substantial responsibility for regulation even 
though the legislature in this matter sits high on Capitol Hill 
and prefers to avoid responsibility. One reason is that, as 
shown in Part II.A, the Court would have an ally that is even 
more powerful than Congress: public opinion. 
Calling upon elected officials to help decide how, but not 
whether, to remedy the most significant violations of the consent-
of-the-governed norm is better than starting by rolling out the 
guillotine to kill some statute found to violate the norm. The 
call should make the following points: 
(1) Members of Congress, having sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, are duty bound to bring themselves into 
compliance with the consent-of-the-governed norm to the 
extent practical; 
(2) It would be practical for them at the very least to vote on 
the regulations deemed significant under the longstand-
ing executive order; 
(3) The process through which Congress organizes itself to 
cast such votes is up to Congress, but one option is the 
Landis-Breyer proposal; 
(4) That process must, however, comply with Article I, in-
cluding its requirement that “the Yeas and Nays of the 
Members of either House on any question shall, at the 
Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the 
Journal;”236 and 
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(5) If the Court finds that Congress has failed to do its duty 
by a date certain, the courts, also duty bound to enforce 
the Constitution, will act. Such action would be to strike 
any new rule of private conduct brought before the Court 
whose promulgation by an agency has not been ap-
proved through the Article I legislative process, unless 
the government shows that the rule is not significant. 
Optimally, but not necessarily, the Court would issue the call 
to Congress in a case that does not directly threaten the reliance 
interest in delegations to expert agencies. Chadha or Clinton 
suggest the kind of case I have in mind. Both involved statutes 
that, as I have argued, could be described as delegating legisla-
tive power but not to an expert agency.237 Other such cases 
could come along, as suggested by President Trump’s sup-
posed order to American companies to stop doing business in 
China.238 
If Congress does not respond to the call by the date certain, 
the Court would replace the judicially unmanageable “intelli-
gible principle” test with one geared to whether the regulation 
is significant. A test based upon the significance of each rule 
has a strong foundation in precedent. As already noted, the 
Court in its 1825 decision in Wayman v. Southard stated that 
Congress may delegate power to issue “minor regulations.”239 
This language in Wayman does not appear in Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissent in Gundy.240 
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To define significant regulations in modern circumstances, 
the Court could rely upon the definition of “significant regula-
tory action” in the executive order that has been in force for 
more than a quarter century under two Democratic and two 
Republican Presidents.241 In particular, the Court could rely 
upon the first part of the executive order’s definition that de-
fines significant regulations as having an “annual effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more.”242 So, a regulation would be 
deemed significant if it increased or decreased costs by such 
amount. The $100 million test does not, of course, appear in the 
Constitution, but the Court regularly adopts bright-line tests to 
make judicially manageable enforcement of norms that the 
Constitution states in amorphous terms.243 The Court, however, 
would not need to adopt such a test if Congress itself adopts a 
definition that is at least as inclusive. And, even if Congress 
fails to so do and the Court adopts the $100 million definition, 
                                                                                                        
 241. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641–42 (1994), reprinted as 
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012). 
 242. Id. § 3(f)(1). 
 243. Here are some examples. Faced with enforcing the constitutional provision 
that requires the President to get the consent of the Senate for important appoint-
ments except “during the Recess of the Senate” but does not define “recess,” U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3, the Court decided that Senate confirmation is presump-
tively needed if it is out of session for less than ten days. NLRB v. Canning, 573 
U.S. 513, 538 (2014). Faced with enforcing the Equal Protection Clause’s require-
ment that both houses of the state legislature must be apportioned based on popu-
lation, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, but acknowledging that some deviations 
from population equality may be necessary, the Court decided that population 
deviations of 10 percent or less were insufficient to make a prima facie case of 
invidious discrimination. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983). Faced with 
enforcing the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial without defining the size of 
that jury, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, the Court decided that a jury with less than six 
members would impair the purpose and function of the jury. Ballew v. Georgia, 
435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). Faced with enforcing the constitutional provision requir-
ing probable cause for searches and seizures without defining a timeline for 
providing probable cause, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, the Court decided that deter-
mination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will as a general matter comply 
with the promptness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. County of Riverside 
v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). The Court also deals with amorphous con-
stitutional norms by adopting bright-line tests that are not numerical. See, e.g., 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (holding that police cannot initiate 
an interrogation after a defendant has requested counsel), rev’d by Montejo v. 
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699–701, 704–
05 (1981) (finding an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause re-
quirement for temporary detentions when there is a warrant to search a house for 
drugs). 
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Congress could supplant it later by adopting a definition that is 
at least as inclusive. 
The executive order’s definition goes on to include additional 
grounds for finding a regulation significant.244 These additional 
grounds are, however, amorphous and so would raise prob-
lems of judicial manageability. The Court should leave these 
additional grounds out of its own test of significance. Congress 
could, however, include them in any statute it passes in re-
sponse to the Court’s call for action or later. 
Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson have also sug-
gested a test based upon the $100 million figure in the execu-
tive order.245 They helpfully point out that although this “line is 
concededly arbitrary . . . it is not obvious to us why an under-
inclusive arbitrary line is worse than no line at all.”246 
Unlike the “intelligible principle” test, the $100 million test 
would be judicially manageable. “Intelligible principle” is un-
manageable because it looks to how much the statute says 
about the goals that the agency must pursue. With statutes call-
ing for agencies to pursue a wide variety of goals—such as pro-
tecting health, stopping unfair trade practices, or preventing 
discrimination—rank ordering how much the statutes say 
about goals would be like comparing the proverbial apples and 
oranges. Nor is there any objective scale on which to set a cut-
off as to how much intelligibility is enough.247 
In contrast, the $100 million test does provide an objective 
scale. Of course, determining the economic impact of a regula-
tion does involve estimating, but the courts could put the bur-
den on the agency to show that its regulation has an impact 
                                                                                                        
 244. The definition goes on to include regulatory actions that “adversely affect 
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competi-
tion, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal gov-
ernments or communities.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 641. It 
would be consistent with the consent-of-the-governed norm if the President 
amended the definition to, say, define as significant regulations with annual bene-
fits of $100 million or more or adjusted the $100 million cut-off to take account of 
inflation. 
 245. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Depravity of the 1930s and the Mod-
ern Administrative State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 821, 856–57 (2018). 
 246. Id. at 857. 
 247. See Schoenbrod, supra note 227, at 1231, cited with approval in Gundy v. 
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2140 n.62 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 79 (2015) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997). 
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that is below the benchmark. Reviewing such a showing is 
standard judicial work. Alternatively, Congress could assign 
the estimation job to the Congressional Budget Office.248 
The new test would be judicially manageable even under the 
strict concept of manageability the majority in Rucho v. Common 
Cause249 used to find that the courts could not judge claims of 
unfair partisan gerrymandering.250 The majority found that 
claims of political gerrymandering “have proved far more dif-
ficult to adjudicate” than those claiming violations of the one-
person, one-vote rule.251 “The basic reason is that, although it is 
illegal for a jurisdiction to depart from the one-person, one-
vote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination in districting, ‘a 
jurisdiction may engage in [some] constitutional political gerry-
mandering.’”252 In contrast, the original meaning of the consent-
of-the-governed norm is every bit as absolute as that of the 
one-person, one-vote norm. 
There are, however, impediments to complete judicial enforce-
ment of both the one-person, one-vote norm and the consent-
of-the-governed norm as originally defined. With one-person, 
one-vote, the impediment is that the state has a legitimate 
interest in matters other than complete equality in the popula-
tions of legislative districts. One such interest is making legisla-
tive boundaries correspond to municipal boundaries. So, courts 
presumptively uphold the districting if the deviations among 
the populations of districts do not exceed ten percent.253 With 
                                                                                                        
 248. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 245, at 856 n.163. 
 249. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 250. See id. at 2500–02. 
 251. Id. at 2497. 
 252. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)). 
 253. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983); see also Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964); SANDRA M. STEVENSON & WENDY VAN WIE, 6 AN-
TIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 86.04(2) (2d ed. 2019); John P. Ludington, 
Annotation, Constitutionality of Legislative Apportionment: Supreme Court Cases, 77 L. 
ED. 2d 1496 (2012). 
 The Rucho majority goes on to argue that: 
Even if we were to accept the dissent’s proposed baseline, it would return 
us to “the original unanswerable question (How much political 
motivation and effect is too much?).” Would twenty percent away from 
the median map be okay? Forty percent? Sixty percent? Why or why 
not? . . . The dissent argues that there are other instances in law where 
matters of degree are left to the courts. True enough. But those instances 
typically involve constitutional or statutory provisions or common law 
confining and guiding the exercise of judicial discretion. 
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the original meaning of the consent-of-the-governed norm, one 
impediment is Congress cannot enact all the rules, as discussed 
in Part II. 
With the one-person, one-vote norm, the impediment to 
complete judicial enforcement—other legitimate state inter-
ests—guides how much deviation from equality to allow. With 
the consent-of-the-governed norm, the impediment to judicial 
enforcement—legislative practicality—could guide the choice 
of a cutoff on the significance of regulations. 
Although deciding how best to circumvent the impediments 
to enforcement of the consent-of-the-norm would require the 
exercise of some discretion, requiring Congress to vote on 
significant regulations would circumvent the biggest embar-
rassment that would result from instructing the lower courts to 
distinguish between “important subjects which must be entirely 
regulated by the legislature itself,” and “those of less interest, 
in which a general provision may be made, and power given to 
those who are to act . . . to fill up the details.”254 The courts 
would not be seen to be picking and choosing among regulatory 
statutes or agency actions. Rather, the norm would apply to all 
new regulations with an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more under all statutes, whether they increase or de-
crease regulatory protection. 
That Congress should vote on all significant regulations al-
ready has a certain bipartisan pedigree. As already noted, it 
came from a leading New Dealer (Dean Landis) and was elabo-
rated by a Supreme Court Justice who is an expert in regulation 
and was appointed by a Democratic President (Justice Breyer). 
Subsequently, Republican legislators in the House have repeat-
edly passed the REINS bill, which incorporates a version of the 
Landis-Breyer proposal. Yet, as shown in Part III.C, both par-
ties in Congress have worked to avoid subjecting their mem-
bers to the responsibility the Landis-Breyer approach would 
impose. 
Rolling out the guillotine would be easier after having called 
upon Congress to address the problem and when single regula-
tions, rather than entire statutes, are to be struck. Previously 
                                                                                                        
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2505 (citations omitted). In contrast, the Court found that there 
would be conflicting concepts of what constitutes reasonable fairness in legislative 
districting. See id. at 2504–07. 
 254. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). 
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having discussed the norm and Congress’s failure to adhere to 
it to the extent practical, the Court’s constitutional intervention 
would not come as surprise. Moreover, the Court will have 
made clear it prefers Congress to make the policy judgments 
needed to comply with the norm. Indeed, even if Congress ini-
tially fails to decide how it will bear responsibility and the 
Court holds that it will strike significant regulations Congress 
has not approved, Congress could come up with an alternative 
way of taking responsibility. Professor Lessig argues that the 
Court can allow such leeway.255 
Congress might respond constructively to a call from the 
Court to honor the consent-of-the-governed norm despite the 
credit-claiming, blame-shifting advantage its members now 
reap from delegation. The call would highlight the clash be-
tween their current behavior and, as discussed in Part II.A, the 
public’s overwhelming desire for a government based upon a 
consent of the governed and, in particular, for a Congress that 
takes responsibility for policy. As such, failure of the lawmak-
ers in Congress to take responsibility for the laws would bring 
blame. Still more blame would come from failing to adopt re-
forms that would remove the cloud of uncertainty as to the va-
lidity of existing regulations. If Congress fails to remove that 
cloud, the Court would have strong justification for itself de-
ciding not to apply the new test to old regulations.256 
                                                                                                        
 255. Professor Lessig argues that courts should accede to a legislature’s way of 
complying with the meaning of the Constitution “where the legislature has done 
the important work of translation itself.” LESSIG, supra note 93, at 272. 
 256. The Court could avoid applying the new test to old regulations despite the 
statement in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), that: 
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that 
rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full 
retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all 
events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our 
announcement of the rule. . . . [W]e now prohibit the erection of selective 
temporal barriers to the application of federal law in non-criminal cases. 
Id. at 97. Yet, as previously described in Part III.C, applying a new and stronger 
test of the consent-of-the-governed norm to old regulations would cause great 
pain given the ensuing uncertainty about the validity of the huge volume of old 
regulations. Fortunately, however, Harper should not control here because the 
reasons the Court gave in that case either do not apply here or do so very weakly, 
especially given that Harper itself announced its own, new judicially created retro-
activity rule. What the Court did there in one direction, it can do again in another 
direction on another quite distinct issue. One reason offered in Justice Thomas’s 
opinion for the Court in Harper is that the judicial function “strips us of the quin-
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Moreover, both businesses and advocates of strong regulation 
would rankle at agencies being unable to change regulations. 
Incumbents could take credit now for enacting the reform, and 
responsibility for the hard choices on regulation could be post-
poned until after the next election. That responsibility would 
apply to both parties whereas now either party in Congress 
that unilaterally gives up the credit-claiming, blame-shifting 
advantages of delegation would put itself at an electoral disad-
vantage. Finally, a Congress whose approval ratings have 
dipped as low as the single digits in recent years lacks the cred-
ibility with the public to put up much of a fight.257 Moreover, a 
failure by Congress to respond constructively would legitimate 
more intrusive judicial action. 
Eventual success in getting Congress to take responsibility 
for significant new rules would tend to reduce the impedi-
ments to the Court enforcing the norm and enable it to require 
Congress to begin gradually to take responsibility for the most 
important old rules. Moreover, as Christopher DeMuth has 
                                                                                                        
tessentially ‘legislat[ive]’ prerogative to make rules of law retroactive or prospec-
tive as we see fit.” Id. at 95 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)). This point is too broad because, as Justice Scalia recog-
nized, “[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most 
executive or judicial action . . . .” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Another reason offered in Justice Thomas’s opinion 
is that “selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly 
situated [parties] the same.” Harper, 509 U.S. at 95 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet applying the con-
sent-of-the-governed norm retroactively would, given the ensuing uncertainty 
and upset, harm just about everyone. Moreover, the parties subject to the old reg-
ulations did not rely upon the Court applying the new test of the norm to old 
regulations and so have no reliance interest in the courts’ doing so. Finally, Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Harper offers an additional reason for retrospectivity: 
“Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism . . . .” Id. at 105 
(Scalia, J., concurring). The Court’s earlier carving of a giant exception to the con-
sent-of-the-governed norm constitutes massive judicial activism. In sum, if need 
be, a strong case can be made that the rule in Harper should not apply in the con-
sent-of-the-governed norm’s application to old regulations. 
 257. Americans’ Approval of Congress Drops to Single Digits, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 
2011), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/25/us/
politics/approval-of-congress-drops-to-single-digits.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
5TL8-8BP8]. Recent Gallup polls found that voters approved of how the Supreme 
Court does its job by a margin of 54 to 42 percent but disapprove of how Congress 
does its job by margin of 68 to 27 percent. Gallup Poll, Supreme Court, GALLUP, https://
news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx [https://perma.cc/VQ5H-TLX6] (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2020); Congress and the Public, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/
1600/congress-public.aspx [https://perma.cc/KH5T-ND69] (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
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suggested, a President who wants Congress to take responsibility 
for regulation has diverse means to force Congress to do so.258 
V. FAR-FETCHED RATIONALES FOR IGNORING THE NORM 
A. The Constitution Permits Congress to 
Leave Lawmaking to Agencies 
Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule contend that “a 
statutory grant of authority to the executive branch or other 
agents never effects a delegation of legislative power” and that 
no authority to the contrary appears until the late 1800s.259 For 
example, they argue that Locke’s statement that a legislature 
may not delegate its legislative powers “is fully consistent” 
with their position that Congress may pass statutes that author-
ize the executive branch to make law but may not authorize it 
to pass statutes.260 
Professors Posner and Vermeule’s article reveals the weak-
ness of their argument by failing to even mention, let alone try-
ing to distinguish, Federalist No. 75, Fletcher v. Peck, or Gibbons v. 
Ogden.261 The article also reveals its weakness by contending 
                                                                                                        
 258. Christopher DeMuth, Presidential Reform of the Regulatory State 18 (Feb. 
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ccdemuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/
05/Presidential-Reform-of-the-Regulatory-State.pdf [https://perma.cc/P34Z-Q3TG]. 
 259. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1721–22. 
 260. Id. at 1727. Similarly, Professor Cynthia Farina argues that, because the 
President can delegate, so can Congress. Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Non-
delegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 90–93 (2010). For a rousing rebuttal, see 
Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Ad-
ministrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 178–81 (2017). 
 261. Professors Posner and Vermeule do discuss Brig Aurora but, in quoting it, 
omit the language that indicates the Court upheld the statute on the basis that it 
gave the President the power to apply a rule by finding “the occurrence of any sub-
sequent combination of events” rather than to proclaim a rule. Posner & Vermeule, 
supra note 26, at 1737–38. In particular, they omit the sentence that suggests that 
the President’s job was to find facts rather than make law: “The 19th section of 
that act declaring that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer, 
could not restrict their power of extending its operation, without limitation upon 
the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.” Cargo of the Brig Aurora 
v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813). They may have missed the 
importance of this language because they looked for evidence of the “intelligible 
principle” in Wayman v. Southard and unsurprisingly not finding it, conclude the 
Court displayed no definitive signs of a concern with delegation until late 1892. 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1722, 1738–39. 
 Professor Jerry Mashaw objects to characterizing the President’s role as one of 
rule application. “The Court’s description of the President’s role, which involved 
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that its argument is consistent with “[t]he Framers’ principal 
concern [of] legislative aggrandizement—the legislative seizure 
of powers belonging to other institutions.”262 That leaves out a 
concern that is at least as fundamental to the Framers—consent 
of the governed. As Justice Kagan recently wrote, “If there is a 
single idea that made our Nation (and that our Nation com-
mended to the world), it is this one: The people are sover-
eign.”263 Yet, Professors Posner and Vermeule do not even men-
tion Federalist No. 51 and its position that, to repeat, “[a] 
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on 
the government.”264 
B. Even Early Congresses Ignored the Norm 
Professor Jerry Mashaw contends that, whatever the people 
were told about consent of the governed in the late 1700s, early 
elected officials never felt obliged to comply with any such 
norm.265 He writes, “From the earliest days of the Republic, 
Congress delegated broad authority to administrators, armed 
them with extrajudicial coercive powers, created systems of 
administrative adjudication, and specifically authorized ad-
ministrative rulemaking.”266 
He goes on to state that “any claim that early Congresses de-
clined to delegate broad authority to others must . . . conjure 
with the First Bank of the United States. The Bank’s function, in 
effect if not in form, was essentially that now served by the 
                                                                                                        
delicate diplomatic negotiations, complex bilateral understandings, and uncertain 
compliance, was surely a model of understatement concerning the presidential 
discretion effectively conferred on him to find a fact.” JERRY L. MASHAW, CREAT-
ING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 99 (2012). Yes, the President got to set the strategy 
to get other nations to respect American neutrality, but the President’s job with 
respect to the rule enforced in Brig Aurora was far simpler: to find whether other 
nations were respecting American neutrality. 
 262. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1733. 
 263. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2511 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 264. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 4, at 319 (James Madison). 
 265. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 25. Though disagreeing with this argument, I 
nonetheless admire his book for showing that the early federal government had a 
larger administrative apparatus than previously understood and that the separa-
tions among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches were far from neat. 
 266. Id. at 5. Professors Posner and Vermeule make a similar argument, but I 
will focus on Professor Mashaw’s version because it is more detailed and was 
written more recently. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1732–41. 
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Federal Reserve Board in regulating the money supply.”267 
Professor Mashaw’s example makes it seem that Congress 
granted the First Bank legislative power because the Federal 
Reserve does now impose rules regulating how much banks 
can lend in order, in part, to control the money supply.268 Yet, 
the law establishing the First Bank did not give it the power to 
regulate other banks.269 It did affect the money supply, but by 
deciding how much money it would lend. Congress could have 
taken that decision away from the First Bank but leaving it 
with First Bank was not a delegation of legislative power. 
In this example and many others, Professor Mashaw fails to 
demonstrate that the early Congresses systematically delegated 
their power to make the rules of private conduct because he 
conflates (1) Congress ceding legislative powers which it alone 
was supposed to exercise (such as making the rules of private 
conduct) with (2) Congress letting others make decisions that 
Congress itself need not make but could and sometimes did 
(such as allowing a bank to decide how much money it would 
lend). The two are distinct, as Dean Ronald Cass shows.270 Yet, 
Professor Mashaw applies the word “delegate” to both. That is 
semantically correct but is nonetheless confusing because only 
the first violates the norm that Article I establishes.271 
In his extended analysis of Professor Mashaw’s book, Professor 
Joseph Postell shows that early Congresses “largely refrained” 
from delegating legislative powers to administrators and did so 
because of their commitment to the constitutional principle of 
nondelegation.272 There were some temporary deviations in 
which Congress granted lawmaking powers to administrators, 
most notably the infamous Embargo of 1807 to 1809.273 Professor 
Mashaw writes that the embargo statutes “featured stunning 
                                                                                                        
 267. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 47. 
 268. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2012). 
 269. An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 
10, 1 Stat. 191 (1791). 
 270. Cass, supra note 260, at 155–58. The distinction appears in Wayman v. 
Southard. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825). 
 271. Many of Professor Mashaw’s examples of Congress delegating are of its 
letting others do what Congress itself did not have to do. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra 
note 261, at 46 (granting the President the power to decide how to distribute con-
gressional appropriated funds to veterans). 
 272. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 78. 
 273. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 91–118. 
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delegations of discretionary authority both to the President and 
lower-level officials,” and therefore it “has much to teach us 
about early understandings of the nondelegation doctrine.”274 
This embargo that began in 1807—the one in Brig Aurora275 
arose under later legislation—was, as Professor Mashaw help-
fully explains, borne out of desperation.276 In the course of a 
war with each other, Britain and France seized American mer-
chant ships and kidnapped their crews.277 These were acts of 
war against the United States, which was neutral in the conflict, 
but American officials were afraid of responding militarily 
against great powers.278 As an alternative, President Thomas 
Jefferson recommended keeping American ships at home and 
depriving Britain and France of American exports.279 He asked 
Congress to authorize such action and it did so.280 
It is, however, wrong to conclude that the Embargo of 1807 
to 1809 signifies acceptance of delegation.281 The statute gener-
ated protest in Congress that led ultimately to cutting back the 
President’s power.282 As Professor Postell sums up, “[T]he em-
bargo was a temporary deviation from the typical policy deci-
sions of the early republic, one that that was nearly universally 
acknowledged as a colossal failure, and thus is of very limited 
value as an indication of what early American politicians re-
garded as legitimate.”283 It certainly was not an example of the 
congressional buck passing that drives so much delegation today. 
Indeed, the embargo brought blame. 
Another example that Professor Mashaw highlights is how 
Congress responded to the dangers of a new technology, 
steamboats.284 The boilers of early steamboats tended to explode 
                                                                                                        
 274. Id. at 90. 
 275. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). 
 276. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 91–92. 
 277. Id. at 91. 
 278. Id. at 91–92. 
 279. Id. at 92. 
 280. Id. at 92–93. 
 281. Professor Philip Hamburger argues the legislation might be seen as giving 
the President the power to determine facts that would trigger the applicability 
of law rather than to make law. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
UNLAWFUL? 107–10 (2014). 
 282. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 96. 
 283. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 78. 
 284. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 187–208. 
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with fatal consequences.285 Congress passed the Steamboat Act 
of 1852, which Professor Mashaw cites as an instance of early 
Congresses freely delegating the power to make rules of pri-
vate conduct.286 It was not such an early Congress, coming as it 
did six decades after the ratification of the Constitution, and 
not much of an example at that. The statute, as he describes it, 
used “administrative rulemaking as a principal technique for 
articulating regulatory standards.”287 Yet, Professor Postell 
finds only two sections of the statute where “[t]he supervising 
inspectors were given rulemaking power.”288 One called for the 
inspectors, as the statute put it, to make rules “for their own 
conduct” and that of the inspectors working under them.289 
This power, Professor Postell aptly argues, was not to make 
rules governing private conduct, but rather to govern official 
conduct and so did not violate the consent-of-the-governed 
norm.290 
The other provision called for the inspectors to make rules 
for ships passing each other.291 The genesis of this provision 
suggests no comfort with Congress empowering others to 
make rules of private conduct. As Professor Postell recounts, 
the bill, as originally introduced, contained a section with de-
tailed rules on this subject based upon traditional practices.292 
Legislators objected because they did not understand the sec-
tion and particularly how these practices, which varied with 
whether a ship was going upstream or downstream, applied 
when tides reverse the direction of the water’s flow, as can 
happen far inland in some rivers.293 At the end of the legislative 
process in the House, the House passed a bill which included 
150 amendments, one of which gave the inspectors broad rule-
making authority over ships passing each other.294 The Senate 
                                                                                                        
 285. Id. at 188. 
 286. Id. at 192. 
 287. Id. at 152. 
 288. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 98. 
 289. Act of August 30, 1852, ch. 106, § 18, 10 Stat. 61, 70. 
 290. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 98–99. 
 291. Ch. 106, § 29, 10 Stat. 61 at 72. 
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acceded because it was left with the choice of the House bill or no 
bill at all dealing with the deaths from steamboat explosions.295 
The original language suggests members of Congress ex-
pected to state the rules themselves. The great bulk of the bill 
showed them doing so. It is often highly specific, containing 
detailed rules on a wide range of issues bearing on steamboat 
safety, from availability of lifeboats and firefighting equipment 
to the pressure in boilers, and much more.296 Here is one example: 
That every vessel so propelled by steam, and carrying pas-
sengers, shall have not less than three double-acting forcing 
pumps, with chamber at least four inches in diameter, two to 
be worked by hand and one by steam, if steam can be em-
ployed, otherwise by hand; one whereof shall be placed near 
the stern, one near the stem, and one amidship; each having 
a suitable, well-fitted hose, of at least two thirds the length 
of the vessel, kept at all times in perfect order and ready for 
immediate use; each of which pumps shall also be supplied 
with water by a pipe connected therewith, and passing 
through the side of the vessel, so low as to be at all times in 
the water when she is afloat: Provided, That, in steamers not 
exceeding two hundred tons measurement, two of said 
pumps may be dispensed with; and in steamers of over two 
hundred tons, and not exceeding five hundred tons meas-
urement, one of said pumps may be dispensed with.297 
Such detailed provisions are more like a regulation that a 
modern agency would put in the Code of Federal Regulations 
than an enabling statute that a modern Congress would put in 
the United States Code. Yet, Professor Mashaw compares the 
1852 statute with modern statutes creating “the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion, and the Environmental Protection Agency in the 1960s 
and early 1970s.”298 
Professor Mashaw dismisses the specifics in the statute by 
stating that the steamboat inspectors had “considerable discre-
tion.”299 The statute did leave some room for judgment calls, as 
                                                                                                        
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 101. 
 297. Ch. 106, § 3, 10 Stat. 61 at 62. 
 298. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 21. 
 299. Id. at 192. 
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in the phrase “a suitable, well-fitted hose” in the section quoted 
at length above. Yet, the inspectors, who were expected to 
come from the steamboat business, could base their determina-
tions on their knowledge of practices in their line of work,300 
much as common law juries in that era would base their judg-
ments about reasonable care on practices in their own commu-
nities. Thus, the judgments left to the inspectors could be of 
rule application rather than rulemaking. Alternatively, these 
judgments would be considered as rulemaking of the “fill up 
the details” variety. Either way, the legislators had taken re-
sponsibility for the politically salient choices. It was nothing 
like modern statutes in which members of Congress grant leg-
islative powers to avoid personal responsibility for the laws.301 
In sum, for many decades after the ratification of the 
Constitution, members of Congress tried to make the rules of 
private conduct themselves, but sometimes fell short. As Professor 
Daniel Walker Howe chronicles, legislators in the early decades 
took positions on the hard choices.302 In contrast, as Part III.D 
shows, modern Congresses issue detailed instructions but still 
manage to skirt the hard choices. 
C. The Court Enforced the Norm in 
Only One Year of Hundreds 
Referring to Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry striking 
down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 
1935, Professor Cass Sunstein quipped that the constitutional 
bar on Congress delegating legislative power has “had one 
good year and 211 bad ones (and counting).”303 Yet, as Professor 
Mark Tushnet recently blogged, “It’s not true,” citing Carter in 
1936.304 I have cited other examples: Knickerbocker Ice in 1920, L. 
Cohen Grocery Store in 1921, and Washington in 1924.305 One 
could also arguably cite Clinton in 1998 and Chadha in 1983, es-
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pecially in light of the gloss put on it by Loving.306 Indeed, Jus-
tice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy cites these cases along with the 
void for vagueness cases and other cases to show the Court has 
taken the norm seriously.307 More importantly, Congress sub-
stantially honored the norm well into the 1800s.308 Brig Aurora 
and Wayman upheld challenged statutes on reasonable 
grounds. That the cases were brought suggests litigants were 
willing to raise delegation arguments. That more cases were 
not brought suggests there was not much worth challenging. 
D. The Constitution Was Amended to Eliminate the Norm 
Professor Ackerman argues that the decisive reelections of 
President Roosevelt after his confrontation with the Court was 
a “constitutional moment” that amended the Constitution to 
allow Congress to delegate its legislative powers.309 In contrast, 
Professor William Leuchtenburg concludes that whatever else 
the voters might have been doing in 1936, they were not con-
sciously amending the Constitution.310 The public did not think 
of itself as amending the Constitution at the time, and the 
Court has not so regarded it since.311 
More fundamentally, the Constitution is not just an agreement 
on how government should work in response to the will of the 
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Id. at 430. 
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governed, but it is also an agreement on how the Constitution 
can be amended in response to the will of the governed. The 
Constitution, of course, includes an explicit, formal process for 
its amendment.312 Although there is something to be said for 
substance over form, form does have its uses. A formal 
amendment would have had to make clear whether the elec-
torate opposed a procedural requirement that Congress take 
responsibility, or rather that it cared more about President 
Roosevelt’s policy objectives, whether any such change was 
meant to be permanent or only for the duration of the emer-
gencies of the Great Depression and World War II, and whether 
the amendment permitted only the broad (“here’s a problem, 
fix it”) delegations that typified the New Deal or also the nar-
row (“we get the credit, the agency gets the blame”) delega-
tions of the Clean Air Act and its aftermath discussed in Part III 
of this Article. Finally, if Professor Ackerman is correct that the 
Constitution was amended by a shift in public opinion, why is 
it not equally so that the Constitution was reamended when 
public opinion later began to call for Congress to take respon-
sibility, and Congress feigned doing so, as discussed in Parts 
II.A and III.C? 
E. Delegation Is Consistent with Consent of the Governed 
Professors Posner and Vermeule argue that Congress is ac-
countable for agency-made rules. They do so in several para-
graphs of suppositions about how legislators and voters be-
have.313 But these suppositions are not supported by reference 
to the work of political scientists—the social scientists who sys-
tematically describe such behavior.314 To the contrary, political 
scientists conclude that, in many circumstances, delegation al-
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lows legislators to take credit for popular consequences and 
shift blame for unpopular ones.315 
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Professors Posner and Vermeule also argue that the account-
ability of the President as executive preserves the consent of 
the governed.316 Yet, a President serving a second term escapes 
accountability at the polls altogether because the Constitution 
bars a third term.317 And even a first term President largely es-
capes blame for the burdens imposed by agencies. Some agen-
cies are independent of presidential control. And although 
most are subject to it, Presidents usually will personally an-
nounce only those rules that the White House political advisors 
think will be popular.318 Otherwise, the President leaves the 
announcement to the agency head. The agency head can usually 
shift some of the blame to the statute or the court decisions that 
structured the agency’s decision making. Everyone is responsi-
ble, so no one is. 
Moreover, few if any regulatory issues become important in 
a national presidential election because they are usually over-
shadowed by the President’s work as commander in chief, dip-
lomat in chief, economic strategist, and national leader. These 
roles generally let the President appear aloof from choices 
about regulation. In contrast, how members of Congress would 
vote on such regulatory issues could be important in many of 
their reelection campaigns. 
One might argue that voters should do the homework neces-
sary to see through such trickery, but they will not and they 
should not have to. As Professor Jeremy Waldron writes, 
“[T]he agent-accountability that is involved in democracy puts 
the onus of generating that transparency and the conveying of 
the information that accountability requires on the persons being 
held accountable. . . . [T]he agents owe the principal an account.”319 
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F. Canons of Statutory Construction 
Serve the Purpose of the Norm 
Professor Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court has re-
placed the constitutional bar on delegation with various “non-
delegation canons” of statutory construction, which he calls 
collectively “The American Nondelegation Doctrine.”320 It, he 
argues, serves the purposes of the traditional doctrine.321 In his 
words, it stops “legislative shirking . . . by requiring Congress 
to make the relevant judgments. . . . [E]xecutive officials cannot 
seize on vague or general language to produce specified kinds 
of outcomes. The legislature must authorize those outcomes in 
advance, and with a high level of particularity.”322 The kinds of 
outcomes for which agencies need clear legislative statements 
of authorization include, to list some of Professor Sunstein’s 
examples, those arising from the agency asserting the power to 
act retroactively, extraterritorially, or in ways that create serious 
constitutional problems, or would bring about an enormous 
and transformative expansion in its regulatory authority.323 
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Clear statement requirements are often, but not always, sen-
sible tools in statutory interpretation.324 However, clear state-
ment requirements do little to stop shirking by Congress. An 
example is the 1970 Clean Air Act, which, as discussed in Part 
III.D, plainly authorized the agency to protect health, but al-
lowed politicians to take credit for healthy air while shifting 
blame to the EPA and the states for failing to deliver and the 
economic burdens concomitant with pollution reduction.325 
That is why legislators of both parties voted for it almost unan-
imously in 1970.326 
So, yes, members of Congress are elected and must authorize 
agencies to make law. But with great skill they shift blame to 
the agencies for the unpopular consequences such as regulatory 
protection not delivered or regulatory burdens imposed. That 
is not consent of the governed.327 
In sum, Professor Sunstein asserts that Congress can delegate 
sweeping power to agencies if it does so bluntly. That is bizarre 
because he would treat purposeful violations of the consent-of-
the-governed norm more leniently than inadvertent violations 
even though the harm to the government is apt to be particu-
larly great where Congress is most insistent that it wants to 
evade responsibility. 
* * * * * 
That so many highly intelligent scholars can do no better 
than make such far-fetched arguments for ignoring the consent-
of-the-governed norm bolsters the argument for recognizing it. 
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CONCLUSION 
We like the administrative state. After all, most people want 
the regulatory protection we were promised agencies would 
provide. That is why Congress passed the regulatory statutes. 
Nonetheless, we also dislike the administrative state. After 
all, most people want members of Congress to take personal 
responsibility for regulations and thus to be accountable for 
both the burdens imposed and the shortfalls in regulatory pro-
tection. By failing to take such responsibility, Congress pits us 
against ourselves. 
Many influential people benefit from Congress’s failure to 
take responsibility: the agency officials who get the power, 
lawyers whose income and sense of importance come from 
their role in the abstruse processes that now have the last word 
on regulation, and most importantly the members of Congress 
who prefer to avoid responsibility for hard choices so long as 
members of the opposing political party do. 
The job of securing the consent of the governed the Declaration 
of Independence promised, and the Constitution requires, thus 
falls to the Supreme Court. It has no duty more supreme 
than judging compliance with the Constitution. None of the 
Constitution’s norms is more supreme than the consent of the 
governed. As Justice Kagan recently wrote, “[T]he need for ju-
dicial review is at its most urgent in cases” where “politicians’ 
incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving citizens with-
out any political remedy for their constitutional harms.”328 
Yet, in response to assertions that Congress violates the 
consent-of-the-governed norm by outsourcing responsibility, 
the Court currently outsources its own responsibility for judg-
ment to Congress. That is poetic injustice. It should stop. Once 
the Court does its duty, Congress can do its duty. 
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